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Abstract
Networks may need to be interconnected for various reasons such as inter- organizational communication, redundant connectivity, increasing data-rate and minimizing
delay or packet-loss, etc. However, the trustworthiness of an added interconnection
link cannot be taken for granted due to the presence of attackers who may compromise the security of an interconnected network by intercepting the interconnections.
Namely, an intercepted interconnection link may not be secured due to the data
manipulations by attackers. In the first part of this dissertation, the number of interconnections between the two networks is optimized for maximizing the data-rate
and minimizing the packet-loss under the threat of security attacks. The optimization of the interconnectivity considering the security attack is formulated using a
rate-distortion optimization setting, as originally introduced by Claude E. Shannon
in the information theory. In particular, each intercepted interconnection is modeled
as a noisy communication channel where the attackers may manipulate the data by
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flipping and erasing of data bits, and then the total capacity for any given number
of interconnections is calculated. By exploiting such formulation, the optimal number of interconnections between two networks is found under network administrators
data-rate and packet-loss requirement, and most importantly, without compromising the data security. It is concluded analytically and verified by simulations under
certain conditions, increasing interconnections beyond an optimal number would not
be beneficial concerning the data-rates and packet-loss. In the second part of this
dissertation, the vulnerability of the interconnected network is analyzed by a probabilistic model that maps the intensity of physical attacks to network component
failure distributions. In addition, assuming the network is susceptible to the attack
propagation, the resiliency of the network is modeled by the influence model and
epidemic model. Finally, a stochastic model is proposed to track the node failure
dynamics in a network considering dependency with power failures. Besides, the
cascading failure in the power grid is analyzed with a data-driven model that reproduces the evolution of power-transmission line failure in power grids. To summarize,
the optimal interconnectivity among networks is analyzed under security attacks,
and the dynamic interactions in an interconnected network are investigated under
various physical and logical attacks.
The proper application of this work would add minimum number of inter-network
connections between two networks without compromising the data security. The optimal number interconnections would meet network administrator’s requirement and
minimize cost (both security and monetary) associated with unnecessary connections.
This work can also be used to estimate the reliability of a communication network
under different types of physical attacks independently and also by incorporating the
dynamics of power failures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Overview and motivation

Modern communication networks are interdependent due to the service or support
(both infrastructural and logical) they receive from one another. These networks
are interconnected through the communication gateways, which we termed asthe
multilevel (ML) network. A ML network is composed of several interconnected and
interdependent sub-networks of varying sizes ranging from small to medium to large,
with varying security levels and capacities. Although almost all network infrastructures (military, commercial or private) can be represented by a single topological
level concept, it would be precise to model it using the concept of a ML network.
Therefore, the representation of such ML network architecture is important, because
it can represent the physical infrastructure and attributes of many of todays special
communication networks, such as communication networks that serve the military.
The infrastructural dependency among networks is primarily needed for efficient
communication between different networks. A similar terminology named multilevel
network is described in [1], where the term multilevel implies all five abstract layers

1
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Figure 1.1: A physical topology for a ML communication network.

of OSI (open system interconnection) model. The authors in [2] have introduced a
framework termed multi-provider network. Akin to this effort, we have defined each
level of our ML network as the physical infrastructure of different networks. Figure
1.1 shows a prototype of a ML communication network of the types described here
for military communication. We categorize the physical infrastructure of an interdependent communication system into three scales: small, medium and large. The
specifications of each scale are given in Table 1.1. For instance, the small, medium
and large networks can be military networks, wide area networks and commercial
networks, respectively.
Because of these interconnections many network-security issues may arise which
we describe in the following. At first, a secure network may be exposed to security
attacks through interconnections, such as an interconnection may be intercepted by
intruders/attackers [3]. Some example such attacks such as bit-flipping attack [3],

2
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Table 1.1: Specifications of each level in a ML network
```
``` Network size
```
```
Parameter
``
`

(a)

Small

Medium

Large

Number of nodes ∼ 100

∼ 1000

∼ 10000

Bandwidth

low

high

high

Security

high

low

low

(b)

(c)

Figure 1.2: Different types of logical attacks on networks: a) bit-flipping attack b)
jamming attack c) packet-dropping channel
.
jamming attack [4] and packet-dropping scenarios [5] shown in Fig. 1.2.
Apart form the above logical security issues, since the ML communication network
is a physical infrastructures various physical attacks can directly damage components of a communication networks. For example, man-made attacks such as WMDs
(weapons of mass destructions), HEMPs (high-altitude electromagnetic pulses) and
natural disasters including earthquake (2006 earthquake in Taiwan), hurricane (Katarina in the USA and Mexico in 2005), tornadoes, flood, lightening, snow/strom,
wildfires (2006 wildfires in California) are shown to damage components of communication networks. Figure 1.3a shows the emulation of a man-made attack (i.e.,lowaltitude EMP attack) on the central region of the USA [6]. This attack is shown
to be directly failed the components of the communication network. Figure 1.3b
shows the percent of wirelines and wireless subscribers that were out of service in
the affected areas in the USA and Mexico due to the 2005 hurricanes [7]. Here the
horizontal-axis represents the date, the vertical-axis is the percentage of subscribers
out of service. From the figure we see, for Katrina, the peak reaches nearly 50% of

3
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(a)

(b)

Figure 1.3: Effect of different types of physical attacks on networks: a) emulation
of a low-altitude EMP attack on the central region of the USA b) percentage of
wirelines and wireless subscribers that were out of service in the USA and Mexico
due to 2005 hurricanes
.
the total subscribers, which were approximately 3 millions subscribers.
Moreover, attacks may propagate among networks through interconnections. For
example, security attacks such as Malwares (Viruses, Worms) can propagate from
one node to another node [8] and a secure network node may be compromised due to
the propagation of threat/risk from less secure networks. An example of such attacks
is WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, that affects 200,000 computers across 150
countries, total damages ranging from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars
(see Wikipedia/News articles). In addition, node removal (failure) can increase the
stress/traffic to other nodes, which may result in congestion [9]. Congestion-induced
Internet collapse occurred in October 1986, when the speed of the connection between
the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and the University of California at Berkeley, which
are located only 200 meter apart, dropped by a factor of 100 [10].
Further, the functionality of a ML communication network is dependent on the
uninterpretable power supply, i.e., proper operation of the power grid. However,
the power-grids are also vulnerable to physical attacks and natural disasters. For
instance, during northeastern USA and Canada blackout on August, 2003, 3,175

4
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communication networks of 1700 organizations (business entities, government, education institutions) suffered from abnormal connectivity outages. Of those, more
than 2,000 networks suffered severe connectivity outages for longer than 4 hours, and
over 1,400 networks for longer than 12 hours (some even longer than 48 hours) [11].
As we have seen the properly functionality of a communication network is heavily dependent on various real-world physical and logical attacks. The vulnerability
analysis of the communication network to attacks is the main motivation of this
dissertation. Hence, this work is mainly about the analyzing the dynamics of communication network under different types of attacks. We characterize how different
types of attacks affect the functionality of a network and considering these attacks
how we can find optimal interconnection among networks. In addition, the vulnerability and resiliency analysis of the ML network considering the attacks and
the influence of power failures can significantly improve the reliability analysis of a
realistic ML communication network.

1.2

Literature review

In this section, we review the works related each chapters of this dissertation. In
addition, we also point out the limitations of these works and briefly describe contributions of this dissertations where necessary.

1.2.1

Prior work on optimizing inter-network connections
among networks

The literature related to the optimal inter-network connection can broadly be divided
into two parts: combating security attacks and optimizing interconnectivity among
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networks. First, we describe the security issues occur due to interconnections. Generally, an interconnected system comprised with individually secure systems is not
secure [12], because different networks usually have distinct security policies, control
structures, and infrastructural vulnerabilities, as in the case of interconnected military and commercial networks for example [13]. Hence, by compromising a lower
secure system an attacker may compromise and access data from a highly secure
system through their interconnections [12]. In [13] Shake et. al. suggested using
highly secure gateway nodes for interconnecting a military network with commercial
networks. By adding some overhead to IPSec (IP Security) protocol for the military data (packet) that are routed through commercial networks, a security measure
to overcome the attack issues was proposed in [14]. These complex authentication
procedures and cryptographic encryption algorithms can minimize the security vulnerabilities of networks. However, these methods come with associated costs of large
overhead bits, which, in turn, leads to the reduction of spectral efficiency [15] and
also may increase packet (information)-loss due to the limited transmission capacity
of the communication links. In addition, an error in the encrypted data may result
in serious decryption issues as the authors described in [16]: a good cryptographic
algorithm should be such that a one-bit error in the input to the decryptor should
result in about 50% of the decrypted bits to be wrong. Moreover, the distortion due
to packet-loss can be recovered by retransmitting the lost packets (as done in ARQ
(Automatic Repeat Request) protocol), which again results in a reduction of the
effective throughput of the networks. Security schemes for the physical layer rather
than the upper OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) layers were broadly discussed
in [17], and Harrison et. al. proposed to use error-correction coding for implementing security measures in the physical layer [18], which is closely related to the work
presented in the chapter 2 from the security aspect. It is important to note that
the security issues may also occur due to attack on nodes of a network and these
attacks may propagate between networks through interconnections [19]. However,
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here capture a scenario where the attackers directly intercept the interconnections;
hence, compromise the security of a node indirectly, which is a realistic approach for
modeling the security aspect of the interconnected networks.
On the other hand, the literature of interconnectivity among different networks
has mainly been focused on military and commercial systems [13, 14]. However, in
all those works it was assumed that these interconnections are secure, and hence the
authors did not present any analytical procedures on how interconnection should be
made considering the security issues that may occur due to the added interconnections. To fill this gap, here we propose a mathematical model to incorporate the
security interceptions introduced by the added interconnections and solve for the
optimal number of interconnections between two communication networks analytically. Notably, there are analytical works on the optimization of interconnection
in cyber-physical systems, where the interdependency may lead to the cascading
failures in power grids, and subsequent failures of communication nodes which may
directly depend on power nodes [20–23]. These works have used the percolation
theory to optimize the interconnection in a cyber-physical system based on different
constraints [21–23]. However, the dynamics of the interconnectivity problem between
communication networks are different than the cyber-physical system.

1.2.2

Prior work on the vulnerability analysis of ML networks under attacks

Most existing analyzes of network failures start from a given (fixed) network topology
and then focus on various stressors [24,25]. Moreover, many of prior studies on physical stressors were limited to single or geographically-isolated small-size attacks or
disasters [26,27]. The impact of large-scale stressors on networks was first introduced
in [28]. Inherently, large-scale stressors lead to geographical-correlation amongst the
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failures of network components within the stressor’s geographical proximity. Geographical correlations among large number of component failures is modeled in [28]
based on the geographical proximity of network components from stressor centers.
However, the authors only considered a single stressor event at a time, and failure
of any network component within the range of stressor was assumed to be deterministic. However, multiple attack/disaster events can occur simultaneously and their
effects on network-component failure are not deterministic. A probabilistic failure
model with multiple circular stressor events has been proposed in [25]. However,
the authors assigned a fixed failure-probability to all network components, which
may not be realistic. Further, assumption of only circular-shaped stressors does not
completely capture the impacts of various stressors on a network. A more realistic Gaussian shape function for modeling range and intensity of several stressors
was used in [29]. In addition, the authors also used a Strauss point process [30] to
characterize the geographical correlation among stressors. There are other works on
network failures where SRLG information was used to characterize the correlated
link failures in a network [31]. Following a stressor event and by assuming that all
components belong to an SRLG will fail with some (fixed) probability, a simple approach to model correlated failures in a network was proposed in [32]. Correlated
failures in networks were also studied based on attacks in the logical layers [33, 34].
In contrast to all previous works, we propose a probabilistic model for capturing the
intensity of various stressors. Furthermore, we devise a new formulation to compute
the failure probabilities of all components in a communication network considering
their coupled vulnerabilities.

1.2.3

Prior work on the propagation of attacks in a network

Attack propagation among different networks has particularly been studied between
military and commercial networks. In [35] the authors discussed the crucial dif-
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ferences between the commercial and military network. While interconnecting a
military network with commercial networks, Shake suggested to use highly secure
gateway nodes [13]. In [14] authors proposed to overcome security issues by adding
some overhead (IPSec protocol) to the military data (packet) that are routed through
commercial networks. Moreover, some of the major challenges in realizing a global
network (a network infrastructure that allows military to get information whenever
and wherever they need) were summarized in [36]. The authors in [37] proposed
a layered network protocol different than the OSI or TCP/IP to establish a global
communication network for performing military communications across the world.

Surprisingly, the mathematical modeling of propagation of security risk through
interconnections has not been studied much in literature. A relatively close work
is [38], where the authors tested different network topologies (e.g., stars, cliques,
cycles) to design the intra-connectivity structure of a network in order to maximize
the resiliency and connectivity. In contrast, our work deals with the interconnection among different independent subnetworks, specifically, between a highly secure
network and networks with relatively low level of security. Further, we have used constrained optimization formulations for maximizing efficient interconnections among
subnetworks.

On the other hand, there are analytical works on the propagation of failures in
cyber-physical networks, such as one closely related to our work is [39], where the
authors optimized the interdependency in cyber-physical network using the evil-rain
influence model. The major departure in this work from [39] is that, rather than
assuming all the nodes are vulnerable to attack, we have considered nodes in the less
secure network are vulnerable and the vulnerability is assumed to propagate to the
secure network.
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1.2.4

Prior work on the influence power-failures to the dynamics of networks

A substantial amount of work has been done on the topic of network reliability as
well as on cascading failures in interdependent systems (a brief review of the latter
can be found in [40]). Initially most of the works were concentrated on a single
network such as power grids, communication and computer networks, transportation networks, etc. [28, 41, 42]. However, the interdependency among cyber-physical
networks can lead to failure dynamics that cannot be captured by analyzing the networks independently [43–45]. Motivated by the massive power and communication
blackout in Italy on 28 September 2003, Buldyrev et al. modeled the network failure due to interdependency between power and communication networks based on
percolation theory [20]. In [46], the authors looked at the robustness of the coupled
communication and power networks. Although the authors in [20, 46] have observed
the role of interdependency between two networks to design a robust network, they
did not consider the intra-dependency within. On the other hand, an influence model
has been used to capture the intra-dependency and the cascading failures within a
power grid [47]. Later Rahnamy-Naeini et al. [39] proposed a cascading resilient
interdependent power and communication network model based on the influencemodel framework and optimized the inter-dependency between two interdependent
networks. It was assumed in [39] that the total influence imposed on a communication node distributed among its neighbors and supporting power node. However,
as described in the previous section, a communication node can independently fail
due to power disruption as well as the failure of communication components, which
cannot be captured by the framework given in [39]. Therefore, in this work we focus
on the vulnerability of communication networks with two independent influences,
one from the neighboring communication nodes within the network and the other
from the supporting power nodes. To the best of our knowledge, these two types
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of influences have not been considered independently to analyze failure dynamics in
communication network.

1.2.5

Prior work on the cascading failures in power grids

Cascading failures in the power grid have been studied extensively. A review of the
state-of-the-art models of cascading failure along with their advantages and disadvantages can be found in [48]. Here we briefly describe the probabilistic models
that are closely related to the work presented in this chapter 6. In [49] a branching
process is used to parametrically model the dynamics of cascading failures, where
parameters of the branching process are estimated from real-world blackout data.
Later, in [50] the authors have modified the model presented in [49] by replacing the
constant parameter of the branching process with a more realistic variable propagation rate of the cascading failure. However, in both papers, the authors assumed all
the transmission lines have an identical impact on the evolution of cascading failure.
In [41] Rahnamy-Naeini et al. have proposed a Markov chain based abstract model,
named SASE (Stochastic Abstract-State Evolution), to analyze cascading failures in
a power grid considering operating constraints, such as load-shedding, power grid
loading level, and capacity estimation error. The SASE model is an analytically
tractable model that can predict the probability of blackout sizes in time as well
as the conditional distribution of the blackout sizes given the initial number of line
failures. We follow the similar simulation approach introduced in [41]. However,
in contrast to [41] that assumed single line failure for simulating cascading failures,
here we allow multiple line failures in our simulation, which mimics real-world cascading failure dynamics more closely [51]. In [51] the authors have used the resistance
distance and pseudoinverse of the grid admittance matrix to analyze the cascading
failure in the power grid after a line failure. They have also proposed a heuristic
algorithm to calculate the set of initial line failures that result in a minimum ratio
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Figure 1.4: The contribution of this dissertation.

between the final demand after the cascade stopped and the initial demand when
the cascade started. Different from previous works, in chapter 6, we characterize the
evolution of cascading failures through the transmission lines of different capacities
by a nonlinear parametric model that is based on simulation data.

1.3

Contributions of this dissertation

The main thrust of this dissertation is to analyze the vulnerability of communication network to different types of physical and logical attacks. In addition, we also
take into account the dependency of the communication network on the vulnerability
of the supporting power grid. We form a ML communication network considering
security vulnerabilities of inter-network connections and propagation of security attacks through connections. Then the resiliency of the communication network is also
analyzed considering the attack vulnerability of the power grids. Then a separate
work on cascading failures in the power grids is characterized through transmission
line failure evolution. The chronological dependency of the contributions of this
dissertation is shown in Fig. 1.4.
At first we look into problem how to interconnect two networks to form a ML
network (especially, a 2-level network) considering security interception on the interconnecting links. The trade-off between security and data-rate enhancement is
analyzed by optimizing the number of connections between two networks under the
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threat of security attacks. The optimization of the inter-network connection for
maximizing the data-rate and minimizing the packet loss (represents the degradation of the quality of service) is formulated using a rate-distortion theory setting,
as originally introduced by Claude E. Shannon in communication theory. In particular, each added connection that is vulnerable to data manipulation by attackers
is modeled as a noisy communication channel. Subsequently, the Shannon entropic
capacity for any given number of connections is calculated, and the corresponding
packet-loss is modeled based on the required data rate. By exploiting such models,
the optimal number of connections between two networks is found under network administrators’ data-rate and packet-loss requirements, and most importantly, without
compromising the data security. Moreover, the proposed theory identifies condition
on attacker’s data manipulation probability to differentiate scenarios of vulnerability
when increasing the number of connections between two networks. In the vulnerable
situation, this work provides a threshold on the optimal number of inter-network
connections that results in a point of diminishing returns in increasing the number
of connections.
So from the first problem, we will get a interconnected network which we name
as the ML network. However, various cyber-physical infrastructures such as communication networks and power grids are known to be vulnerable to large-scale
stressors ranging from natural disasters to intentional attacks such as those effected by weapons of mass destruction and high-altitude electromagnetic pulses.
The stresses instigated by these events can cause damage to critical components
of the network infrastructure. In this second work, a general probabilistic model is
developed for assessing the vulnerability of a communication network under various
catastrophic events. A scalable ML network framework is proposed to capture the
inter-dependencies across various communication networks in the infrastructure. For
a given large-scale stressor, the initial-failure probability of each network component is formulated independently and then by taking into account the failure of the
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components that it depends upon. This enables the modeling of a shared failure
among network components. Detailed simulations of a three-level network model are
performed and key network-performance metrics are computed including the total
network capacity, the maximum flow and the number of node failures. This work
paves the way to model and evaluate the reliability of critical communication networks under massive stressor events.
In the second problem, we have seen impact of attacks result in some initial failures in the ML network. Note that, these are not necessarily physical, mostly logical
security attacks e.g., cyber attacks. At this point, we ask, what if these initial failures propagate? What is the resiliency of the network in steady state? In this third
work, we maximize the interconnectivity among subnetworks under the constraint of
security risk. We model the dynamics of security risk propagation by the evil-rain
influence model and the SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) epidemic model. By extensive numerical simulations using different network topologies and interconnection
patterns, it is shown that the efficiency of interconnectivity (vulnerability) increases
nonlinearly (linearly) with the number of interconnections among subnetworks. Finally, parametric models are proposed to find the number of interconnections for
any given efficiency of interconnectivity and resiliency of the secure network. The
importance of this work is that, we can know the status of a secure network when
that network is susceptible to attack propagation.
Till now, we have a model for initial failures in communication networks under
attack and analyzed the propagation of those initial failures and find steady state.
In other words, we have modeled the dynamics of communication network independently. However, we have ignored one important part of the physical system, which is
power. As we know the functionality of a communication network depends on power
network as well and the vulnerability of power networks due to attack can directly
affect the supporting power supply components of the communication networks and
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can interrupt the functionality of the communication components. In other words,
both intra-dependency among various components inside a communication network
and inter-dependency with supporting power supply nodes can contribute to the
propagation of the initial failures. Under the probabilistic initial failures of the network’s physical infrastructures, in the fourth work, we develop a stochastic model to
track the functional dynamics in a communication network considering dependency
among communication nodes as well as with power nodes. A closed-form analytical
formula is derived to find the steady state probabilities of all communication nodes
in the communication network which are influenced by power node’s functionalities. The significance of this work is that it captures effect of power failure on the
communication network which is important for any real-world network.

Finally, the previous work assumed power nodes are independent on each other,
which is a simplistic assumption. Hence in the final work, we analyze the cascading
failure in the power grid by using a data driven model. In this work, a parametric
model is proposed that represents the propagation of transmission line failures in
the power grid. At first, by optimal DC power-flow simulations of the IEEE 118
bus system, different types of data on the transmission line failures are collected,
which can capture the time evolution of the cascade. The probability that a line of
a given capacity fails is found to be well approximated by a power-law (the higher
is the capacity the lower the probability). Then based on these data, a discretetime parametric model is proposed to keep track of the failures of lines of different
capacities during a cascading failure event. The convergence of the evolution of line
failures to the steady state is analyzed. Finally, when compared to real-world data,
the model is shown to be capable of reproducing similar trends for the time evolution
of the failure dynamics. The significance of this work is that it can reproduce the
time-evolution of the failure dynamics of transmission lines in a power grid given the
grid topology.
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1.4

Organization of the dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we first form a ML (2-level)
network considering the security attacks on the added inter-network connections. We
formulate this problem is an interconnection optimization problem between two networks. The constraints of this optimization problem are data-rates and the packetloss. The outcome of this work is the following: a fundamental theoretical limit on
the number of interconnection using rate-distortion theoretic formulation that meets
users specified requirement.
The infrastructure of that ML network is vulnerable to large-scale physical attacks
ranging from natural disasters to intentional attacks such as WMDs, EMPs. These
types of catastrophic events can cause damage to critical components of the network
infrastructure. Then in chapter 3, the vulnerability of ML network to different types
of physical attacks is analyzed. We develop a probabilistic model for assessing the
vulnerability of a communication network under various catastrophic events.
In chapter 4, we dig a bit more into the problem: we model how these initial
attacks can propagate between networks and thus how it increases vulnerability of
a secure network due to the propagation of a threat/risk from less secure networks.
We also model resiliency of the network at steady state, (i.e. number of node survived when the attack propagation is stopped). in summary, we analyze how this
initial failures propagate between networks through interconnections and affect the
resiliency of the network in chapter 4.
In chapter 5, we extend the dynamical analysis of a communication network under
the influence of power failure due to attack. In other words, we develop a stochastic
model to track the functionality dynamics of a communication network considering both intra-dependency among communication nodes and inter-dependency with
power nodes. We derive a closed form analytical solution to track the functionality
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dynamics of a communication network considering dependency with power nodes.
In chapter 6, based on the data from optimal DC power-flow simulations of the
IEEE 118 bus system, a nonlinear parametric model for simulating the evolution of
transmission line failure in power grids is proposed.
Finally, we conclude our works and provide future research directions in chapter
7.

1.5

Publications resulting from the dissertation

A list of our publications, related to this dissertation, is as follows:

1. Pankaz Das, Rezoan A. Shuvro, Mahshid R. Naeini, Nasir Ghani, Majeed M.
Hayat. “Optimizing Interconnectivity among Networks for Maximizing Data
Rate and Minimizing Packet-loss under Security Attacks ,” to be submitted in
IEEE Transactions on Communications, 2018.
2. Pankaz Das, Rezoan A. Shuvro, Mahshid R. Naeini, Nasir Ghani, Majeed M.
Hayat, “Stochastic Functionality Dynamics of Communication Network under
the Influence of Power Failure, under preparation, 2018.
3. Pankaz Das, Mahshid R. Naeini, Nasir Ghani, Majeed M. Hayat, “On the Vulnerability of Multi-level Communication Network under Catastrophic Events,”
IEEE ICNC, San Jose, USA, 2017.
4. Pankaz Das, Rezoan A. Shuvro, Zhuoyao Wang, Mahshid R. Naeini, Nasir
Ghani, Majeed M. Hayat. “Stochastic Failure Dynamics in Communication
Network under the Influence of Power Failure.” IEEE WiMob, Rome, Italy,
2017.
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5. Pankaz Das, Rezoan A. Shuvro, Mahshid R. Naeini, Nasir Ghani, Majeed
M. Hayat “Efficient Interconnectivity among Networks under Security Constraint,” IEEE MilCom, LA, USA, 2018.
6. Pankaz Das, Rezoan A. Shuvro, Zhuoyao Wang, Majeed M. Hayat, Francesco
Sorrentino “A Data-Driven Model for Simulating the Evolution of Transmission
Line Failure in Power Grids,” IEEE NAPS, ND, USA, 2018.
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Chapter 2
Optimizing interconnectivity
among networks under security
attacks
Interconnections refer to the communication links that connect two or more networks for mutual communication among network users. By the Code of Federal
Regulations (47CFR51.5) of the United States, “interconnection is the linking of two
or more networks for the mutual exchange of traffic.” The physical linkings between
two carrier’s networks or connections between a carrier’s facilities to its customers are
also referred as the interconnections in telecommunications networks ( [52] Ch. 10).
In general, interconnections among independent networks are inevitable for various
reasons including expansion of the communication capabilities among geographicallydistant networks for seamless communication among users across different networks,
establishing redundant/backup connections in case of failures in the primary system,
increasing data rate and minimize delay by rerouting through high-bandwidth networks when a network has a limited bandwidth, etc. In particular, interconnectivity
between a small-sized network (consisting of a smaller number of nodes with low
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link-bandwidth) and a large-sized network (comprising a more substantial number
of nodes with high link-bandwidth) is required for expanding the communication
range and data rate of the small network. For example, communication networks
such as military, private, and commercial networks, consist of their secure communication infrastructure, which may, however, interconnect with external networks for
the above-mentioned reasons. For instance, a wide range of commercial and noncommercial communication systems and networks are used by military personnel to
support the military communications [53].
Clearly, without interconnections, there are no active communication links between the two networks; hence, the data packets of a network that are to be routed
through the network will be entirely dropped. In addition, when there are smaller
number of interconnections that results in the limited data exchange capability between the networks, the data transmission may face considerable delays. Moreover,
in the worst-case scenario, certain data packets may be dropped (idealizing the effect
of queuing delay to be considerably large or infinite). To remedy such situations, a
larger number of interconnection between networks may be thought of as a viable
solution. Therefore, the more interconnections one establish, the more data rate one
can achieve, and there will be less likelihood of packet-loss.
However, these interconnections can be intercepted by attackers, and once an
interception event occurs, attackers may manipulate the data packets (bits) that are
being transmitted through the interconnections. In particular, an intruder may intercept a communication channel between nodes and may add or delete data/control
messages of sender and receiver ( [8] Ch. 8). For example, the LoRaWAN (Long
Range Wide Area Network) technology that is proposed for IoT (Internet of Things)
has a security vulnerability which may result in a bit-flipping attack, where the attacker can change encrypted data without decrypting it. In [3], the authors showed
an example of bit-flipping in the data that produce wrong information output on
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the receiver side. Further, bit-flipping attacks are familiar to changes in the destination address, digital signatures, and stream ciphers. Besides bit-flipping, the
data bits can be deleted by attackers in certain types of attacks such as in jamming
attacks [4], in packet erasure channels [54]. A communication channel considering
both insertion and deletion of data bits are described in [55] for the binary channels
and in [56] for non-binary channels. Therefore, interconnections come with the price
of security vulnerabilities to the system. Further, since each interconnection opens
a way of interception for the intruders, the more interconnection a network has, the
more prone it is to security attacks. Hence, it becomes important to find the number
of interconnection that gives the required data rate and minimize the packet-loss
without compromising the security of the network.
In this chapter, we respond to the following question: how many interconnections
two networks should have to maximize inter-network data rates while maintaining the
packet-loss below a threshold and limiting the level of compromise in the security of
the system? To answer this question, we first probabilistically model the attacker’s
interception as a nondecreasing function of the number of interconnections that captures the increase of interceptions due to the added interconnections. After interception attackers may manipulate the data thats goes through the interconnection
channel. To model the effect of data manipulation, each intercepted interconnection
is modeled as a noisy communication channel, where we think of noise as the data
manipulation by the attackers; in particular, manipulation refers to the flipping and
erasing of the data bits. Afterwards, we analytically find the Shannon capacity of
the intercepted interconnection channels. From Shannon’s channel coding theorem
( [57] Ch. 7), if one transmit data below the channel capacity, all the adverse effects
on the transmitted data can be corrected at the receiver side using channel coding.
Therefore, the gateway nodes always transmit below the Shannon capacity to undo
the harmful effect of attackers. Note that here the gateway nodes are those connecting the two networks and knows (or estimates) the capacity of the interconnection
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channel. Hence, whenever the data rate of the interconnections exceeds the associated Shannon capacity, some data packets (bits) is dropped by the gateway nodes
to combat the security attacks. Here we define packet-loss distortion as the rate
of dropped packets from the source network due to the finite and limited Shannon
capacity of the interconnections. Considering a certain tolerance level on the packetloss distortion, we define the data rate of a network as the maximum transmission
rate that can be achieved without compromising security. Finally, we propose two
optimization formulations to find the optimal number of interconnections between
two networks based on the network administrator’s requirement on the data rate
and packet-loss distortion. Here the optimality of the number of interconnections
is defined with respect to the maximum data rate and minimum packet-loss distortion. Most importantly, the optimization problems take into account the security
vulnerabilities (interception occurrence and data manipulations) due to added interconnections and find the optimal number of interconnections without compromising
the security at all. As such, we develop an optimal interconnection strategy between
two networks for maximum mutual-information exchange and minimize packet-loss
with combating the security interceptions of the data. The contributions in this
chapter can be summarized as follows:
1) The probabilistic model for the interception of interconnections by attackers
is introduced and the effect security attacks after interception is analyzed through
the data manipulations. Defining associated system parameters and finding the
optimal interconnectivity under the security attacks from the information-theoretic
perspective is an exciting application of the state-of-the-art rate-distortion theory
and Shannon’s channel capacity.
2) Analytic derivation of the closed-form formula for the capacity of an interconnection channel under any given data-manipulation capability of the attackers as
well as theoretical limit of the total Shannon capacity of the interconnections when

22

Chapter 2. Optimizing interconnectivity among networks under security attacks

Figure 2.1: The analogy between our formulation and the rate-distortion theory and
channel coding theorem in information theory.

maximum number of interconnections tends to infinity.
3) While finding optimal number of interconnections that can withstand under
security threats, two optimization sub-problems are formulated and analyzed under
two realistic constraints as follows:
a) maximizing the inter-network data rate while keeping the packet-loss below a
certain user-specified level,
b) minimizing the packet-loss while satisfying user’s data rate constraint.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the analogy between the formulation proposed in this
chapter and the rate-distortion optimization and channel coding concept. In the seminal work of Claude E. Shannon on information theory [57, 58], the rate-distortion
optimization provides a bound on the minimum data rate at the source (transmitter)
that is needed to satisfy a certain distortion requirement at the destination (receiver),
and the more data rate one provides, the less distortion is achievable. However, to
transmit data through a noisy channel reliably, the source-channel coding theorem
provides a bound on the maximum data rate (termed as channel capacity). Combining both theories, to achieve the desired distortion, the source needs to have the
data rate given by rate-distortion theory, and that data rate has to be lower than the
channel capacity for reliable communication (please see Ch. 7 and Ch. 10 of [57] for
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details). Analogous to the rate-distortion optimization, here we increase the number of interconnections between the two networks, which, in turn, increase the data
rate to minimize the packet-loss distortion between two networks. Therefore, intuitively more interconnections mean higher data rates. However, since the attackers
intercept these interconnections for manipulating the data, we provide a maximum
bound on the number of interconnections (similar to the channel capacity) that gives
the maximum data rate between two networks without compromising the security of
the network. To the best of our knowledge, mathematical modeling of the security
issues introduced by added interconnections from information theoretical perspective (specially rate-distortion theory and source-channel coding theorem), and then
use of that formulation to find the optimal number of interconnections between two
networks has not been done heretofore.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we present a realistic example
of the interconnectivity between a small military network and a large commercial
network. The adversary model is described in Section 2.2. The key definitions
and system parameters introduced and elaborated in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we
formulate two optimization problems and find the optimal number of interconnections
under packet-loss and data-rate constraints. Our conclusions and future work are
presented in Section 2.5.

2.1

A realistic example of the interconnectivity
between a small and a large network

Consider a large group of military personnel of a country that is stationed abroad
for certain operations. Groups of this nature are usually supported by an highlysecure independent communication infrastructure consisting of a small number of
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Figure 2.2: The interconnection between a small and large network, and interception
of the interconnection by an attacker. An attacker may manipulate (add/delete)
data after the interception.

nodes. In addition, such a small-sized network with a small geographical range may
have limited connectivity to the outside world for security reasons. However, there
may be need for this network to have high-bandwidth connectivity to the outside
world for various practical reasons. For example, certain military personnel may need
to receive service from Internet service providers, communicate with headquarters
and exchange a large amount of data from databases of collaborating agencies when
needed, etc. One approach to address such need is to use satellite communication.
However, this system have relatively high cost with a substantial end-to-end delay
and lower data rate compared to terrestrial/fiber-optic network. Alternatively, the
small military network may resort to connecting to readily accessible commercial resources with broad bandwidth to achieve a higher data rate. Furthermore, military
networks may also want to keep the commercial network as a redundant communication medium in case of emergency. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the previous
subsections, such interconnections with less secure communication networks may increase the vulnerability of military networks to attacks. This realistic scenario is
replicated by modeling interconnection between two networks, where a highly secure
small network with limited data rate wants to connect with a less secure large network
for achieving high data rate. Beyond the military network and commercial network,
examples of highly-secure small networks and less-secure large networks may include
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private networks and intercontinental backbone networks, respectively. Figure 2.2
shows a scenario of the interconnection between a small and large network and the
possible security interception on the interconnections by attackers. Note that here
we provide a simple example with a small and large network from the application
perspective. However, this work may applicable to find optimal interconnection between any networks irrespective of their sizes as long as interconnections are prone
to attacks.

2.2

The attacker model

The following assumptions are made to model the attackers who may intercept interconnections and manipulate the data causing the inter-network communication
insecure.
1) The attackers may intercept on the bit, packet, signal level of the transmitted
data as assumed in [59]. Without loss of generality, we assume attackers work on the
bit level since each data packet essentially consists of bits.
2) Interconnections cause a network to be susceptible to attack and the probability
of interception by attackers increases as we increase the number of interconnections
between a highly secure network and a network with lower security. This assumption is very intuitive and realistic since having more interconnections increases the
likelihood of exposure of a network to the attackers. For example, it is shown in [12]
that, interconnecting a highly secure system with other systems of lower security
opens up paths for the data to be copied from the highly secure system to the lower
security system. Since the network is compromised due to the interconnections, our
assumption on the increase of security interceptions with more interconnections can
be argued to be reasonable.

26

Chapter 2. Optimizing interconnectivity among networks under security attacks

3) Attackers may have the capability of manipulating data that are transmitted
through the interconnection channels ( [8] Ch. 8). Our attack model represents
the worst-case attack scenario where the attackers may change every bit of a data
packet with some probability. However, in intentional attacks, the attackers may
manipulate specific burst of data if they know the importance of data, the scenario
we are not considering in this chapter.
4) Here we do not consider the effect of noise and interference on the data bits
to keep our focus on the security interception issues; namely, the interconnection
channel is noiseless and channels do not interfere with each other. However, an
additive parameter can be incorporated with the attackers capability parameter to
include the effect of noise.

2.3

Formulation of an equivalent channel for the
intercept-prone interconnection

Without loss of generality, we consider to interconnect two networks and refer to the
source network (Network 1) as the network that needs of connections (e.g., military
system), and the auxiliary network (Network 2) as the network that is available to
provide connections (e.g., commercial system). Clearly, without interconnections no
active communication links exist between two networks; therefore, all the packets of
Network 1 that are destined for Network 2 will be dropped. Further, here queuing
delay is assumed to be infinite for simplicity. Hence, whenever the data rate of the
source network is higher than the aggregated Shannon capacity of the added interconnections, the gateway nodes drop the surpassed packets. The system parameters
of this work are modeled and elaborated in the following subsections. Note that all
these system parameters described in the following subsections are used to find the
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optimal number of interconnections between two networks in the Section 2.4.

2.3.1

The number of interconnections (NX1 X2 )

It is the number of communication links of certain data rate between the gateway
nodes of the two networks. We denote the number of interconnections between Network 1 and Network 2 by NX1 X2 , where X1 and X2 represent the gateway nodes of
networks 1 and 2, respectively. Some of the realistic attributes of these interconnections are as follows. 1) Interconnections are done through the gateway nodes, and a
gateway node in a network may connect to any gateway nodes of the other network;
namely, a gateway node in Network i may have any number of interconnections from
the set {0, 1, · · · , Ni }, where Ni is the number of gateway nodes in Network i. Hence
the maximum number of allowed interconnections between Network 1 and Network
2 is given by Nmax = N1 N2 . 2) The interconnection (channel) is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) ( [57] Ch. 7), and no feedback from the receiver is allowed,
since the feedback does not increase the capacity of a DMC ( [57] Ch. 7). 3) All
interconnections have a same bandwidth.
Note that all the numerical simulation results shown next are based on the following network parameters: consider two networks that are being interconnected with
each other. Network 1 consists of 4 gateway nodes (N1 = 4), and Network 2 consists
of 25 gateway nodes (N2 = 25). Then the maximum number of interconnections
between two networks is Nmax = N1 N2 = 100.

2.3.2

Interconnection channel formulation

Each interconnection channel is characterized by the following two probabilities.

28

Interception probability, pl

Chapter 2. Optimizing interconnectivity among networks under security attacks

1
Linear
Exponential
Logarithmic

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Number of interconnections, NX1 X2

Figure 2.3: The probability of interceptions (pl ) vs. the number of interconnections
(NX1 X2 ) for three types of interception probability models. Here increasing number
of interconnection causes an increase in the probability of interceptions.

Interception probability (pl )
Due to the nature of the attacker model presented in Section 2.2, here each interconnection has a certain likelihood of interception, and more interconnections imply
more interceptions by attackers. Therefore, the probability of interception (pl ) of an
interconnection can be expressed as a nondecreasing function of the number of interconnections NX1 X2 . Since the minimum and maximum number of interconnections
are 0, Nmax , respectively, two extreme cases of the probability of interception are
pl = 0 when NX1 X2 = 0, and pl = 1 when NX1 X2 = Nmax . Here our assumption on
the explicit form of pl are linear, exponential, and logarithmic as expressed below,
NX1 X2
;
Nmax
eαNX1 X2
Exponential : pl = αNmax , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 = shape of the exponential function; (2.1)
e
log(NX1 X2 )
Logarithmic : pl =
, log 0 := 0.
log(Nmax )
Linear : pl =

Note that any other form of pl which is a nondecreasing function of NX1 X2 , may
also be used depending on the nature of interceptions. Figure 2.3 shows the proba-
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(a) Secure interconnection channel

(b) Intercepted interconnection channel

Figure 2.4: The interconnection (channel) model between two networks. (a) Secure
interconnection with zero probability of data error (pe = 0); therefore, the capacity
is 1 bit. (b) The intercepted interconnection (channel) with the capacity Cl with
probability of erasing and flipping are p and pf , respectively. Here,  denotes the
erased packet (bits)..

bility of interceptions (pl ) versus the number of interconnections (NX1 X2 ) for three
types of interceptions given by (2.1). From the figure we see that increasing interconnection increases the probability of interception. Note that all the numerical
simulation results shown in the subsequent sections are generated considering the
linear functional form of pl .

Probability of data manipulation (pe )
Clearly, while not intercepted the interconnection can be represented as a noiseless communication channel which we termed as secure interconnection as shown
by Fig. 2.4a. In contrast, when the interconnection is intercepted, the attackers
may manipulate the data that are flowing through the interconnection channel with
some probability. Namely, the data bits in each interconnection can be jammed
(erased/blocked), and bits in a packet can also be deliberately flipped in malicious
attacks. Therefore, the interception results in a probability of data (bit) flipping (pf )
and data (bit) erasing (p ). The model for an intercepted interconnection is shown by
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Fig. 2.4b. The values of pf and p are determined by the capability of attackers for
manipulating the ongoing data transmission through the interconnections. Further,
these values may be provided by the network administrators or may be estimated
from the historical data of security attacks. Note also that during sniffing, the attackers may copy/eavesdrop the packets for their benefit; however, since it does not
directly change the data bits we model this scenario as the zero capability of manipulating. Hence, the total probability of data manipulation (i.e., data error) in an
interconnection channel due to the flipping and erasure is pe := p + pf .

2.3.3

Properties of interconnection channel

The capacity of an interconnection channel is the property of interest here since
it reflects how good or bad an interconnection channel is. Here we calculate the
following two capacities of interconnection channels to describe their behavior under
interception and manipulation.

Average capacity of an interconnection (C̄)
Considering two cases of an interconnection whether it is intercepted or not as shown
by Fig. 2.4, we can write the capacity of an interconnection as


1, with probablity 1 − pl ,
C=

Cl , with probablity pl ,

(2.2)

where 1 and Cl (to be defined in Theorem 1) are the Shannon capacity of the secure
interconnection channel and intercepted interconnection channel, respectively. Note
that the Shannon capacity of an interconnection (channel) is given by the maximum
mutual information between the channel input and output, where maximization is
taken over the input (symbol) probability distribution [57]. Here we assume a DMC
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to represent each interconnection channel with binary input, and therefore, according
to Shannon’s channel capacity formulation, each interconnection can carry 1 bit of
data (information) in the secure case. On the other hand, we have following theorem
to find the capacity of an intercepted interconnection.
Theorem 2.3.1. Assume a discrete memoryless interconnection channel where binary input data may be flipped or erased by the attackers with a flipping probability pf and erasing probability p . The Shannon capacity of this channel is Cl =




bits, and this is
1 − (p + pf ) log2 1 − (p + pf ) + pf log2 pf − (1 − p ) log2 1−p
2
achieved by a uniform distribution on the input data.

Proof. Let us denote the input and output discrete random variable of the interconnection channel are X = {0, 1} and Y = {0, , 1}, respectively, where  denotes the
erased bit as shown by 2.4b. The mutual information I(X; Y ) between X and Y is
defined as [57]
I(X; Y ) =

XX

p(y|x)p(x) log2

x∈X y∈Y

p(y|x)
bits,
p(y)

where p is the probability mass function of X and Y with p(·) ≥ 0 and

(2.3)
P

z∈Z

p(z) = 1.

Let p(X = 0) = α. Then p(X = 1) = 1 − α. Using the given flipping and
erasing probability, we find p(Y = 0|X = 0) = 1 − (pf + p ), p(Y = 0|X = 1) = pf ,
p(Y = |X = 0) = p , p(Y = |X = 1) = p , p(Y = 1|X = 0) = pf , p(Y = 1|X =
1) = 1 − (pf + p ). Hence
p(Y = 0) =

X
x∈X

p(Y = 0, X = x) =

X

p(Y = 0|X = x)p(X = x)

x∈X

= (1 − (pf + p ))α + pf (1 − α) = α + pf − 2αpf − αp ,
X
p(Y = 1) =
p(Y = 1, X = x) = 1 − α + 2αpf − p + αp ,
x∈X

p(Y = ) = p .
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Substituting these probabilities in (2.3) and after simplifying we get
I(X; Y ) = (1 − pf − p )α log2

(1 − (pf + p ))
α + pf − 2αpf − αp

pf
α + pf − 2αpf − αp
pf
+ pf α log2
1 − α + 2αpf − p + αp
(1 − pf − p )
.
+ (1 − pf − p )(1 − α) log2
1 − α + 2αpf − p + αp

+ pf (1 − α) log2

(2.4)

The Shannon capacity of a DMC is given by the following formula ( [57] Ch. 7)
Cl = max I(X; Y ).

(2.5)

p(x)

To maximize I(X; Y ), we differentiate (2.4) with respect to p(x) = α and setting
the result to zero to get α = 21 .
Now substituting α =

1
2

in (2.4), we find the capacity of the interconnection

channel
Cl = (1 − (p + pf )) log2 (1 − (p + pf )) + pf log2 pf − (1 − p ) log2 (

1 − p
) bits. (2.6)
2

Corolary 2.3.2. The capacity of an intercepted interconnection Cl = 1 − p bits
if pf = 0 which is the capacity of a binary erasure channel (BEC), and Cl = 1 +
pf log2 pf + (1 − pf ) log2 (1 − pf ) bits if p = 0 which is the capacity of a binary
symmetric channel (BSC).
Proof. Substituting pf = 0 and p = 0 in (2.6) it is straightforward to find the
capacity of BEC and BSC, respectively.
Corolary 2.3.3. The Shannon capacity of an intercepted interconnection (Cl ) is no
higher than the raw-link (secure) capacity of the interconnection.
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Proof. It can be seen from the Theorem 1 that Cl can be at most equal to 1 when
there are no flipping and erasing, i.e., pf = 0 and p = 0. For all other any other
values of pf and p , Cl < 1. However, the capacity of a secure interconnection is
always 1.

Figure 2.5a shows the Shannon capacity of a fully intercepted interconnection Cl
concerning the attackers’ data manipulation probability pe for various pf ’s and p ’s.
Two extreme cases of the interconnection channel, namely BSC (pf = 0), and the
BEC (p = 0), are shown by the dashed and dotted line, respectively. The solid black
line shows the interconnection capacity (calculated by (2.6)) when both erasure and
flipping manipulate the data bits equally i.e., pf = 0.5pe and p = 0.5pe . In this
scenario, the capacity (Cl ) is decreasing with the increase of pe and Cl = 0 when
pe = 32 . This is because pf =

1
3

and p = 13 , when pe = 23 . Hence one-third of the

data bits are deleted, and one-third of the data bits are flipped, and also one-third
of the data bits are received correctly. Since the receiver does not know which data
bits are flipped and which are intact, then the uncertainty is maximum at pe = 32 ,
and hence the capacity is zero. Moreover, Cl starts to increase again after pe =

2
3

and reach to 0.5 at pe = 1. This is because the receiver knows all the received data
bits are flipped and interprets 0 as 1, and 1 as 0. Hence all the flipped bits can
be corrected which is 50% of the total bits since pf = 0.5 when pe = 1. Note that
in all the numerical simulations to follow, we assume equal contributions from both
flipping and erasure. However, our model can capture any other combination of the
flipping and erasing.
Lemma 2.3.4. Assume a discrete memoryless interconnection channel as shown in
Fig. 2.4b, where the probability for data flipping and erasing are given by pf and p ,
respectively. The Shannon capacity of the interconnection channel is zero (Cl = 0)
if the probability of data flipping (pf ) is equal to the probability of data transmission
correctly (1 − pf − p ), irrespective of the probability of data erasing (p ).
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Figure 2.5: The capacity of an interconnection channel. (a) The capacity of the
intercepted interconnection (channel) Cl vs. pe for various combinations of pf and
p . (b) The expected capacity of the intercepted interconnection (channel) C̄ vs. pe
for various values of pl .

Proof. Analytically, it can be proved by substituting pf = 1 − pf − p or pf =

1−p
2

in

(2.6). Intuitively, when the probability of bit-flipping and the probability correctly
sent-bits are same, the uncertainty at the receiver side is maximum, i.e., the receiver
cannot decide whether a received bit is flipped or not-flipped with equal probability.
Since the uncertainty is maximum, therefore, the capacity is zero. It is independent
of the portion of erasing since the erased bits are not adding anything to the capacity
of the channel.
Hence, by considering both cases of the capacity of an interconnection given by
(2.2), the average Shannon capacity of an interconnection channel with an interception level pl is
C̄ = E[C] = (1 − pl ) + pl Cl = 1 − pl (1 − Cl ) bits/interconnection,

(2.7)

where E denotes the expectation operator. Figure 2.5b shows the expected capacity
C̄ as a function of pe for different values of pl . Notice that, C̄ decreases as we
increase the interception probability (pl ). Hence for any given pe , the average capacity
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of interconnection channel (C̄) decreases with the probability of interception (pl ).
Further, when an interconnection is fully intercepted, i.e., pl = 1, then we get C̄ = Cl .

The total expected Shannon capacity (CT )
In this subsection, we find the total capacity for the given number of interconnections.
Since there are NX1 X2 active interconnections, we assume the combined interconnection channel of NX1 X2 interconnections forms a product DMC. In a product DMC,
the input and output of the channels are the Cartesian product of input and output
of the interconnection channels, respectively, and the channel transition probabilities
are independent conditioned on the inputs ( [60] Ch. 3). The total expected Shannon
capacity of NX1 X2 interconnections (capacity of a product DMC) is given by ( [60]
Ch. 3)
NX1 X2

CT =

X

C̄i = NX1 X2 C̄ = NX1 X2 (1 − pl (1 − Cl )) bits/second (bps),

(2.8)

i=1

where C̄i = C̄ is due to the identical bandwidth of all NX1 X2 interconnection which
is assumed in Section 2.3 A. We write the the capacity unit as bps since we assume
the product DMC is used once in one second, i.e., NX1 X2 interconnections are used
in parallel per second.
Figure 2.6a shows the total expected Shannon capacity (CT ) versus the number
of interconnections (NX1 X2 ) for different data manipulation (error) probabilities (pe ).
Note the behavior of CT : initially, as we increase the number of interconnections CT
increases; however, after a certain number of interconnections CT does not increase
with the number of interconnections. In worst-case (pe = 32 ), it becomes zero when
the interconnections are fully intercepted (i.e., pl = 1). The behavior of CT is
explained as follows. First it can seen from (2.8) CT is a scaled version of C̄. From
the definition of C̄ given by (2.7), we observe that C̄ is a weighted average of 1 and
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Figure 2.6: (a) The total expected Shannon capacity (CT ) vs. the number of interconnections for various data manipulation (error) probabilities (pe ). (b) The total
Shannon capacity (CT ) in 3D vs. pe and pl .

Cl ; hence, C̄ is always between Cl and 1. In the extreme cases, when pl = 0, C̄ = 1,
and when pl = 1, C̄ = Cl ≤ 1. This implies that CT is always between NX1 X2 Cl and
NX1 X2 ; hence, it is equal to NX1 X2 when pl = 0, and to NX1 X2 Cl when pl = 1. Recall
that since pe does not depend on pl , Cl has a fixed value for a given pe . Now when
pe = 32 , we get Cl = 0 and CT = NX1 X2 Cl = 0 when pl = 1. Note also that there is a
certain range of pe , in which the increase in the number of interconnections results in
the decrease of total channel capacity (as depicted in Fig. 2.6b). Finally, the most
important but unintuitive observation is that adding more connection beyond the
minimum required number is not productive to get more data rates, i.e., CT . This
is due to the security issues introduced by the added interconnections.
Now we describe four extreme cases of the CT for all ranges of pe and pl . First,
the total expected Shannon capacity (CT ) vs. pe and pl is shown in Fig. 2.6b.
Case 1 (pl = 0): When there are no interconnections (NX1 X2 = 0), the interception probability is zero (pl = 0) because the network is not exposed to security risk
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through interconnections. As a result, attackers cannot manipulate data of a secure
network through interconnections. Note also that when pl = 0, CT does not depend
on pe . This region is shown by the solid black oval in Fig. 2.6b.
Case 2 (pe = 0): When the data manipulation probability is zero (pe = 0),
Cl = 1, which implies CT is equal to the NX1 X2 . This is because all the interconnection channels are secure without data manipulation error since pe = 0. Intuitively,
attackers intercept the interconnections; however, since pe = 0, attackers’ capability of changing data (flipping/dropping) through the interconnections is zero. The
dash-dotted red oval shows this region in Fig. 2.6b.
Case 3 (pl = 1): When all the interconnections are fully intercepted, CT depends
on the value of pe (i.e., Cl ). For any given pe , CT = NX1 X2 Cl . The dashed blue oval
shows this region in Fig. 2.6b.
Case 4 (pe = 23 ): When the data manipulation probability is 23 , we observe the
worst-case scenario, i.e., Cl = 0. Therefore, C̄ = (1 − pl ), and CT = (1 − pl )NX1 X2 .
This bound is the minimum capacity we get for any number of interconnections.
Because at this value of pe , attackers manipulate the data such a way the capacity
of the intercepted interconnection becomes zero (Cl = 0). Hence the total capacity
is zero when pl = 1. This is shown by the solid red line in Fig. 2.6a.
The following theorem answers an important question regarding interconnection
in the limit: what if network administrators have capability of making an infinite
number of interconnections?
Theorem 2.3.5. Assume two networks are interconnected with a finite number of
interconnections and hence the intruders can introduce bounded interceptions. With
infinite possibilities on the number of interconnections, the probability of interception
is zero, and the total expected Shannon capacity is equal to the number of finite
interconnections.
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Proof. Here we prove it for the linear interception probability (pl ), the proof for
other interception probabilities are similar. Here for a finite number of interconnections, we have NX1 X2 < ∞. Moreover, given infinite possibilities on the number of
interconnections, we can find pl by taking the limit on the Nmax as
lim

Nmax →∞

pl =

lim

Nmax →∞

NX1 X2
= 0,
Nmax

which implies C̄ = 1 and CT = NX1 X2 bits/second.
In other words, the above theorem says if there is an option to have an infinite
number of interconnections, then having a finite number of interconnections would
result in zero probability of interception. Intuitively, this is because when there are
many interconnections, attackers will not have enough knowledge on the interconnections that are used by two networks; hence, the likelihood of an active interconnection
being intercepted is zero.
Note that here we assume the values of pe does not depend on NX1 X2 and pl . This
assumption is not necessary but can be realistic in some scenarios, where attacker’s
capability of data manipulation is independent of how many interconnections are
established, i.e., attackers have a fixed capability of data manipulation on every
interconnection. Another way to model pe can be that it is increasing with NX1 X2 ,
since more interconnections may enable the adversaries to manipulate more data
than they can do with fewer connections. In the appendix A, we show CT by varying
pe as a function pl i.e., as a function of NX1 X2 .

2.3.4

Packet-loss distortion (Dl )

From the previous subsections, we know each interconnection has a Shannon capacity
given by the interconnection (channel) model, and we also know the total expected
Shannon capacity for NX1 X2 interconnections. The significance of the total expected
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Figure 2.7: (a) The packet-loss distortion model at the source network, d denotes
the lost packet, pd is the dropping probability of a packet. (b) The total packet-loss
distortion (Dl ) vs. the source data rate (Rs ).

Shannon channel capacity comes from Shannons channel coding theorem: for any
δ > 0, if the data rate is less than the channel capacity, then probability of data
error can be made less than δ by channel coding of sufficiently large block length; on
the other hand, if data rate is grater than the channel capacity, then the probability
of error becomes greater than 0.5 when block length goes to infinity [57]. Note that
here we interested to undo the malicious effect of attackers to maintain a secure
communication. Hence, when the data rate of the source network exceeds the total
expected Shannon capacity of the interconnections, some packets will be dropped by
the gateway nodes1 . From this observation, we model the packet-loss distortion as
follows: if the source network data (packet) rate is Rs bps and the total expected

1 Recall

that here we are not considering the role of a queue and the associated queuing
delay for simplicity, i.e., the delay is assumed to be infinite in this chapter. However, the
queuing delay can be incorporated in the model as follows. Each gateway node holds some
packets until its queue is full since the node has a queue of finite size. From the basic
network theory, we know that the queuing delay increases exponentially with the increase
of incoming data rate to the node [8].
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Shannon capacity CT bps, a reasonable formula for the probability of packet-loss is

pd =



0,

1 −

R s ≤ CT
CT
Rs

(2.9)

, Rs > CT .

Since the loss of a packet (bits) is quantitatively similar to the erasure of a bit in
the conventional erasure channel, it is reasonable to model the packet-loss distortion
as an erasure channel. Figure 2.7a shows the packet-loss distortion model at the
source network, where d denotes the dropped/lost packet. Here for simplicity, we
assume each packet consists of one bit, and a packet-loss implies an one-bit drop.
Hence the total packet-loss distortion is given by Dl = pd Rs bps. Figure 2.7b
shows the total packet-loss distortion versus source data rate for a different number
of interconnections. Here when there is no interconnection, i.e., NX1 X2 = 0, then the
gateway nodes drop everything (solid black line). However, as we increase the number
of interconnection the distortion (Dl ) decreases, but it starts to increase again when
the source data rate (Rs ) is higher than the total expected Shannon capacity (CT )
of the interconnections. Recall that for the various number of interconnections we
get different CT ’s.

2.4

Optimal number of interconnections between
two networks

In this section, we find the optimal number of interconnections between two networks
based on the network administrators specified criteria such as the maximum data rate
and minimum packet-loss distortion.
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2.4.1

Optimal number of interconnections under the packetloss constraint

At first, we seek to answer the following question: for any desired packet-loss distortion what is the maximum data rate an interconnected network can achieve, i.e.,
what is the optimal number of interconnections that gives the maximum data rate by
satisfying the specified packet-loss constraint?
To answer the above question, we define the data rate of the source network
considering the normalized packet-loss distortion pd as
Rs (pe , pd ) =

C̄NX1 X2
CT
=
,
1 − pd
1 − pd

pd 6= 1,

(2.10)

where Rs is also a function of pe , since C̄ depends on pe .
The source network data (packet) rate (Rs ) versus the number of interconnections
(NX1 X2 ) for several given normalized packet-loss distortions (pd ) is shown in Fig.
2.8, where we set pe = 0.25, 0.35, 0.55 in three sub-figures, respectively. The solid
red line indicates the total Shannon capacity (CT ) for the given interconnections,
which is the maximum data rate one can achieve without having any distortions
(pd = 0). However, we see if one can tolerate more distortions, then he/she can
achieve higher data rates for a given number of interconnections (shown by the
uparrow in the figure). In addition, observe that Rs is a concave-like function of
NX1 X2 and it achieves a maximum for some values of NX1 X2 (the rate is maximum
somewhere inside the black oval shown in the figure). To find the optimal number
of interconnection that attains the maximum data-rate for any given distortions we
solve the following optimization problem.
In words, we find the optimal number of interconnections that maximizes the data
rate of the source network over the number of interconnections and also satisfies any
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Figure 2.8: The source network data rate (Rs ) with respect to the number of interconnections (NX1 X2 ) for several normalized packet-loss distortion (pd ) under three
pe ’s. For any pe ’s, the data-rate increases if we increase the packet-loss distortion.

desired distortion constraint (p∗d ). Mathematically,
Rs∗ (pe , pd ) =

max

0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax

Rs (pe , pd ) s.t. pd ≤ p∗d .

(2.11)

The output argument of this optimization problem is the optimal number of
interconnections, call it NX∗ 1 X2 . We solve this optimization problem as follows: note
that to maximize Rs (pe , pd ), we need to minimize its denominator. Since 0 ≤ pd ≤
p∗d < 1, then 1 ≥ 1 − pd ≥ 1 − p∗d > 0. Hence as pd → 0, Rs∗ (pe , pd ) → CT , and,
as pd → 1, Rs∗ (pe , pd ) → ∞. As a result, if we increase pd the denominator of Rs
decreases and we get the higher value of Rs . Therefore, we replace pd in (2.11) by
its maximum value p∗d to get
CT
C̄NX1 X2
Rs (pe , p∗d ) =
max
=
max
∗
0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax
0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax 1 − p
0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax 1 − p∗
d
d


(1 − pl ) + pl Cl NX1 X2
=
max
0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax
1 − p∗d

Rs∗ (pe , pd ) =

=
=

max

max

NX1 X2 −

0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax

1 X2
Nmax

1−

0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax

max

2
NX

NX1 X2 −

2
NX

+ Cl

2
NX

1 X2

Nmax

p∗d

1 X2

Nmax
1 − p∗d

(1 − Cl )
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(2.12)
Note that the objective function of (2.12) is a quadratic function of NX1 X2 with the
optimization variable NX1 X2 is an integer and these types of optimization problems
are called mixed-integer quadratic programming (MIQP) problem. Since NX1 X2 is
a positive integer, we cannot directly optimize (2.12) due to the N P completeness
of this problem. However, MIQPs can be optimized by using branch-and-bound
algorithm with the well-known optimization tool Gurobi optimization [61]. The
Gurobi optimizer gives a solution in the integer form specifying the gap between the
upper bound and lower bound of the optimal solution, which we found to be very
small for our problem (less than 10−6 % for an Nmax = 100).
On the other hand, we can solve (2.12) analytically if we assume NX1 X2 is a real
number. Then, for any given distortion p∗d , it is easy to show that the objective function of (2.12) is a concave function of the number of interconnections (see appendix
B). Since the function is concave, if there exists a locally optimal point it will the
global optimal point ( [62] Ch. 4 Section 4.2.2). Hence if there exists a number of
the interconnection that gives the maximum data rates it will be unique (uniqueness
of the number of interconnections). In addition, if the objective function is differentiable then the function is continuous on a closed interval; hence, by the extreme
value theorem the function have a maximum and minimum on the interval (existence
of the number of interconnections). We first differentiate the objective function of
(2.12) with respect to NX1 X2 and set it to zero to get
NX1 X2 =

Nmax
.
2(1 − Cl )

Hence by checking whether the solution NX1 X2 lies in the domain constraint Ω,
the optimal number of interconnections for achieving the maximum data rate is


 Nmax , if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
2(1−Cl )
∗
NX1 X2 =
(2.13)

Nmax ,
if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1 (due to the extreme value theorem).
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Figure 2.9: The rate-distortion curve that maximum achievable rate for any given
distortions. Here the optimal number of interconnections with analytical solution are
NX∗ 1 X2 = 77.7951, 63.2870, 51.5875 and with numerical solution by Gurobi optimizer
are NX∗ 1 X2 = 78, 63, 52 for pe = 0.25, 0.35, 0.55.

Note that in the analytical approach since we have assumed NX∗ 1 X2 is a real number, we need to round the NX∗ 1 X2 to the nearest integer if NX∗ 1 X2 is not an integer.
As mentioned earlier the gap between the optimal solution and integer solution by
Gurubi optimizer is quite small, i.e., the rate difference between the optimal analytical solution and the sub-optimal solution found by the Gurobi optimizer is actually
negligible when comparing both results in Fig. 2.9.
Interestingly, the optimal number of interconnections that gives the maximum
rate is only depends on Nmax (maximum number of interconnection the networks
can have) and pe (attackers data manipulation capability). However, the maximum
rate using these optimal interconnection for any distortion p∗d does depend on the
packet-loss distortion the source network can tolerate and is given by

Rs∗ (pe , pd ) =





Nmax
, if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
NX∗ 1 X2 C̄
4(1−Cl )(1−p∗d )
=
∗

1 − pd
 Nmax∗Cl ,
if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1,
(1−p )
d

where Cl is given by (2.6) for a given pf and p .
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The analytical and numerical solution result in a rate-distortion curve shown as
in Fig. 2.9. Observe that the maximum rate increases with the increase of the
normalized distortion. The significance of this rate-distortion curve is that based on
the desired packet-loss distortion tolerance it can provide the maximum rate one can
achieve without compromising the security at all.

2.4.2

Optimal number of interconnections under data rate
constraint

The previous subsection gives us the maximum rate achievable under a given distortion constraint. In this subsection, we are interested in the following question:
for any desired data rate Rs∗ given by a network administrator, what is the minimum
packet-loss distortion one can achieve over all possible set of interconnections? Like
the previous question, this one is also immensely important from the application perspective, where administrator’s primary concern is the data rate. Mathematically,
the optimization problem can be expressed as
p∗d (pe , Rs∗ ) =

min

0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax

pd (pe , Rs ) s.t. Rs ≥ Rs∗ ,

(2.15)

where pd (pe , Rs ) is defined in (2.9).
Figure 2.10 shows the normalized packet-loss distortion (pd ) concerning the number of interconnections (NX1 X2 ) for various data rates of the source network (Rs )
under three pe ’s. We see pd decreases as we increase NX1 X2 ; however, pd increases
again if the Rs becomes high. As depicted by black uparrow, for any given number
of interconnections, if we increase Rs then pd also increases. Contrary to the rate
versus interconnection curve shown in Fig. 2.8, here we observe that the pd versus
NX1 X2 curve is a convex-like function of the number of interconnections. Further,
there exists a minimum number of interconnection that specifies the minimum distortion for the source network for a given any given Rs (shown by solid magenta
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Figure 2.10: The normalized packet-loss distortion (pd ) vs. the number of interconnections (NX1 X2 ) for various given rates (Rs ) under three pe ’s.

ovals in Fig. 2.10). This minimum number of interconnections also varies with the
values of pe s. Finally, we see that increasing the number of interconnections beyond
the minimum amount is not productive in terms of minimizing the packet-loss distortion. This minimum number of interconnections is termed as the optimal number
interconnections, which we found by solving (2.15) analytically as described below.
From the definition of pd (pe , Rs ) (see (2.9)), we see that pd is increasing with
respect to the rate Rs for a given total Shannon capacity CT . Therefore, since we
want to minimize pd , we take the minimum of the rate constraint and set Rs = Rs∗ .
Then (2.15) becomes

min

0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax

pd (pe , Rs∗ )

=



0,

max

0≤NX1 X2 ≤Nmax


1 −

Rs∗ ≤ CT ,
CT
,
Rs∗

(2.16)

Rs∗ > CT .

In (2.16), CT is the function of NX1 X2 and it is evident that to minimize pd (pe , Rs∗ ),
we need to maximize CT . From the definition of CT in (2.8) and it characterization
curve shown in Fig. 2.6a, we see that for a given pe (i.e., Cl ) and Nmax , there exists
an NX1 X2 (i.e., NX∗ 1 X2 ) that results in the maximum CT which we denote by CT∗ (to
find the CT∗ , similar argument from the previous subsection can be used due to the
concave nature of the CT and assuming NX1 X2 is a real number). Then we have the
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following two cases:
case I : If Rs∗ ≥ CT∗ , then NX∗ 1 X2 is the optimal number of interconnections and
the corresponding minimum packet-loss distortion is equal to 1 −

CT∗
.
Rs∗

case II : If Rs∗ < CT∗ , then we will have zero packet-loss distortion (i.e., p∗d (pe , Rs∗ ) =
0). Note that CT is concave function of NX1 X2 given by (2.8) (where CT∗ is the
maximum of CT ), and since Rs∗ is strictly smaller than CT∗ , then there are at most
two points at which CT and the line Rs∗ intersect. To find those two intersection
points let us solve the CT = Rs∗ . Using linear interception probability pl =
we can write CT = NX1 X2 −

2
NX

1 X2

Nmax

NX1 X2
,
Nmax

(1 − Cl ). Therefore, from CT = Rs∗ , we get

the following quadratic equation NX2 1 X2 (1 − Cl ) − Nmax NX1 X2 √
+ Nmax Rs∗ = 0. The
solution of this quadratic equation is given by NX1 X2 =

Nmax ±

2
Nmax
−4(1−Cl )Nmax Rs∗
.
2(1−Cl )

Since we want the minimum
√ number of interconnections then the optimal number of
solution NX∗ 1 X2 =

Nmax −

2
Nmax
−4(1−Cl )Nmax Rs∗
, Cl
2(1−Cl )

6= 1. Note that NX1 X2 is a real and

2
nonnegative number because Nmax
−4(1−Cl )Nmax Rs∗ ≥ 0, hence Rs∗ ≤

Nmax
, Cl
4(1−Cl )

6= 1

(this is not assumption and this condition hold automatically when Rs∗ < CT∗ , see
appendix C). Notably, for any Nmax and pe (i.e., Cl ), we get the upper bound of the
data-rate Rs∗ that one can support without any packet-loss distortion. Finally, when
Cl = 1, the quadratic equation becomes NX2 1 X2 (1 − 1) − Nmax NX1 X2 + Nmax Rs∗ = 0,
and hence the optimal number interconnection NX∗ 1 X2 = Rs∗ .
Since we assume NX1 X2 is a real number in above two cases, we need to round
NX∗ 1 X2 to the nearest integer to find the (sub-optimal) number of interconnections in
the integer form. Figure 2.11 shows the numerical results of the minimum distortion
versus rate curve for three values of pe . We know that for each pe , we have a
maximum total capacity CT∗ that results from a unique NX∗ 1 X2 . Thus whenever the
rate is lower than CT∗ , we have zero distortion. When the rate crossed CT∗ , the
packet-loss distortion monotonically increases with rates.
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Figure 2.11: The distortion-rate curve

2.5

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we have formulated the optimal interconnectivity problem among
two networks considering the security interceptions that may be introduced by the
added interconnections. We have solved the optimal interconnection problem from
two following perspectives: 1) for any given level of allowed packet-loss distortion,
we have found the minimum number of interconnections that offers maximum data
rate (shown in Fig. 2.8); 2) for any desired data rate, we have also found the minimum number of interconnections that allows communication between two networks
with the minimum packet-loss distortion (shown in Fig. 2.10). Since the number
of interconnections is optimal, we have shown that adding more connection beyond
the minimum required number is not productive to overcome the packet-loss as well
as to increase the data rates. In other words, we have proved that, there exists an
optimal number of interconnections that specifies the maximum allowable data rate
and minimum packet-loss distortion between two networks (shown in Fig. 2.9 and
Fig. 2.11). Note that if the attackers ability of data manipulation (flipping/erasing)
changes then the number of optimal interconnections will also change. Most impor-
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tantly, using the Shannon capacity that ensures the existence of a suitable channel
coding, our formulation outputs the optimal number of interconnections without
compromising data security of the network.

50

Chapter 3
Vulnerability of communication
networks under physical attacks

The functional reliability of many networks largely depends on the geographical
topologies of networks as well as on the locations and impact (geographical extent and
severity) of stressors [28, 63, 64]. Note that stressors imply those events that impose
physical stresses (intense electromagnetic field, heat, pressure, etc.) over a network
and can trigger network component failures. As we are dealing with large-scale
stresses in this work, stressors and attacks/disasters will be used interchangeably.
For example, in the case of a communication network, various network components
such as switches, amplifiers/repeaters, multiplexers and links (fibers, copper cables,
antennas, etc.) can fail either directly from the stressor-events or indirectly as a result
of damage to the components or systems that support the communication network,
e.g., outage of power [65, 66]. Based on the geographical extent and severity of
stresses, the functionality of various networks can be impaired at different scales.
Clearly, the physical topology of the network and the nature of stressors should be
taken into consideration together in the analysis of network reliability.
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Initial damage from certain stressors, e.g., WMDs, HEMPs and natural disasters,
may exhibit a high degree of spatial correlation. Similar to an earlier work [29], we
assume a Strauss point process to model the correlated locations of multiple stressors
that may occur simultaneously. Furthermore, while in [29] the authors only consider
a fixed-form Gaussian degradation function, we generalize it to several degradation
functions (e.g., linear, circular and Gaussian) to describe different types of stress
influences. This function will also be selected probabilistically to capture uncertainty
in the types of stressors. Note that, a degradation function defines the shape, range
and intensity of a stressor over a geographical area.
Inherently, the components of ML communication network possess different types
of security and tolerance requirements based on their importance in the network.
For instance, a military network or a fiber backbone network has extra security
and more robustness to stressors than a commercial network due to the significance
of these networks. We propose an extended probabilistic SRLG formulation that
considers inherent connections among network components to calculate their coupledvulnerabilities to stressors. The advantage of our new SRLG approach is that it does
not require any upper layer (e.g., IP layer) information and allows us to compute the
failure probability of each component based on failure of components that it depends
on. Finally, we provide analytical and simulation results to demonstrate the overall
behavior of a realistic ML network under different types of correlated stressor events.

3.1

Probabilistic model for failures of communication network-component

The goal of this section is to map the spatial distributions of various stressors to a
probability distribution for the network components being functional while consid-
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ering their coupled vulnerabilities.

3.1.1

Modeling correlated stressors

In general, multiple stressors can occur simultaneously either in one geographical
location or they can spread over different locations depending upon the nature of
stressors. Akin to the work done in [29], we have used the Strauss point process
to represent spatially-inhomogeneous and spatially-correlated stressor centers. The
Strauss point process enables us to model multiple stressor events simultaneously.
The locations of these stressors are spatially correlated with each other on a geographic plane [30].
The spread and intensity of these stressors can be different depending upon the
inherent shape and strength of stressors. For instance, a tornado yields different
geographical impact than a nuclear attack or an earthquake. Based on literature
survey, we have found three degradation functions, namely Gaussian [29], circular [67]
and linear [24], that may reasonably characterize various real-world stressors. Figure
3.1 depicts one realization of these three types of degradation functions. A brief
description of them is provided below.
Gaussian: Gaussian stressor intensity degrades according to the Gaussian function as the spatial distance from the location of occurrence increases. The variance
of the Gaussian function specifies the range and intensity of the stressor on a geographic plane. Many real-world attacks and disasters exhibit a Gaussian nature
approximately [29].
Circular : Given a stressor center, a circular degradation function is completely
described by two parameters: radius of the circle and intensity of the stressor at the
center. Intuitively, the only network component residing within the circle is affected
and the intensity at any location is inversely proportional to its distance from the
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Figure 3.1: Three types of stressors on a simulated ML communication network.
Nodes with three colors represent physical nodes of three communication networks
which are placed on a (2500 × 1000) plane.

stressor-center.
Linear : We observed from the statistics of tornadoes that it can occur in any
geographical location in USA. Typically, a tornado has a radius of 80 meters and
length of 3 kilometers [68]. We consider the Poisson point process to model the
locations of occurrence of the stressors. Unlike other disasters, a tornado has almost
equal strength over the region it spreads. Hence, a uniform intensity all over the line
is assumed.

3.1.2

Mapping stressor intensities to the distributions of failures of network components

We denote the stressor(s) event by W = w. We adopt the following assumption from
[29]: Assumption 1. Upon occurrence of a catastrophic stressor event (e.g., WMD,
HEMP, natural disaster, etc.), the initial failure of any network component does not
depend on other components. Due to Assumption 1 and given a stressor event W = w,
the joint failure probability of all network components can be written as the product of their individual failure probabilities. For nodes we have p(v1 , v2 , ..., vN |W =
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w) =
Q

QN

i=1

(vi ,vj )∈E

p(vi |W = w) and for links we have p((v1 , v2 ), ..., (vN −1 , vN )|W = w) =

p((vi , vj )|W = w), where p(vi |W = w) and p((vi , vj )|W = w), denote the

failure probability of the ith node and the (vi , vj ) link, respectively.
Next we find the failure probability of each network component using the following
procedure. Clearly, the likelihood of network component failure increases with the
intensity of stressor and decreases with component’s internal tolerance. Hence, we
define the failure probability of ith node as

p(vi |W = w) = min


Iw (xi , yi )
,1 ,
Ivi (r, c)

(3.1)

where Iw (xi , yi ) ≥ 0 captures the aggregated intensity of stressor at node vi ’s location
(xi , yi ), and Ivi (r, c) > 0 is the internal node tolerance. We define Ivi (r, c) by taking
into account two realistic physical attributes of a node: Ivi (r, c) := r + c, where r ∈
(0, rmax ] is a parameter to capture the resistance (e.g., shielding against HEMP [65])
assigned to a node based on its importance (e.g., higher node-degree or a backbone
node) in the network. In addition, c ∈ (0, cmax ] captures the security requirement of
a node being a network component in the ML network. The values of r and c can
be estimated from the historical data. Note that, Iw (xi , yi ) is non-negative due to
the fact that stressor intensity can only be positive or zero. Intuitively, all network
components possess some resistance to the physical stressors that indicate Ivi (r, c) is
a positive quantity. Hence, we have 0 ≤ p(vi |W = w) ≤ 1, thus p(vi |W = w) is a
probability.
In order to find the link failure probability, we first find the stressor intensities
over all points on the link. Then we take the maximal stressor intensity to consider
maximum impact of the stressor to that link. Since a link can have an infinite
number of points, we have taken L(vi ,vj ) number of points on the (vi , vj ) link to find
the maximum stressor intensity. The link failure probability for the (vi , vj ) link can
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be written as


max



Iw (xl , yl )

 l∈{1,...,L(vi ,vj ) }
p((vi , vj )|W = w) = min 
I(vi ,vj ) (r, c)


, 1 ,

(3.2)

where (xl , yl ) is the location of the lth point on (vi , vj ) link. I(vi ,vj ) (r, c) is the
tolerance of the (vi , vj ) link that we define as the average of internal tolerances of
the two nodes connected by the link: I(vi ,vj ) (r, c) :=

Ivi (r,c)+Ivj (r,c)
.
2

The averaging

of node tolerances in calculating the link tolerance is realistic. For example, if two
nodes are very important then the link connecting them is assumed to have a great
importance.

3.1.3

Characterizing coupled vulnerabilities among components of a network

We model the coupled vulnerabilities among network components using a variation
of SRLG. First note that the functional vulnerability of a node directly affects the
functionality of all links connected to it. Clearly, if a node fails then the links
attached to it cannot be used anymore for communication. Therefore, for a stressor
event W = w, by taking into account the coupled vulnerabilities between nodes and
links, we find the failure probability of (vi , vj ) link as
psrlg ((vi , vj )|W = w) = P((vi , vj ) ∪ vi ∪ vj |W = w)
= p((vi , vj )) + p(vi ) + p(vj ) − p((vi , vj ))p(vi )−

(3.3)

p(vi )p(vj ) − p((vi , vj ))p(vj ) + p((vi , vj ))p(vi )p(vj ),
where the last line follows from Assumption 1. For simplicity of notation, conditioning on the stressor event W = w is removed from the second line. We summarize the
link-failure as Observation 1: The increase in failure probability of a communication node increases the failure probability of all links attached to it. Similarly, link
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failures can cause node failures as well. For example, a HEMP wave that hampers
a link can be carried through the link to the nodes connected to it. We can express
the failure probability of the ith node considering all associated link failures as
psrlg (vi |W = w) = P(vi ∪ (

\

(vi , vj ))|W = w)

j∈N

= p(vi ) + p(

\

(vi , vj )) − p(vi )p(

j∈N

\

(3.4)
(vi , vj )),

j∈N

where {j ∈ N : vj ∈ Neighbor(vi )} is the index set of the neighbors of node vi . Again,
conditioning on a stressor event W = w is dropped from the notation. We now have
Observation 2: The increase in failure probability of all links attached to a node
elevates the failure probability of that node.

3.2

Performance measures

In this section, we define several parameters to evaluate the performance of network
under different stressor scenarios.
Definition 1. Total expected capacity (TEC) of network : This metric measures
the accumulated average (expected) capacity of all network links. Total capacity of a
P
communication network: C = (vi ,vj )∈E Cij , where Cij is the capacity of the (vi , vj )
link. Cij is a random variable that we define as


cij , with probablity p(cij ) = 1 − p((vi , vj )|W = w),
Cij =

0,
with probablity p(0) = p((vi , vj )|W = w),
where cij is the true capacity of the (vi , vj ) link. We find the TEC of a network by
taking conditional expectation (E[·|·]) over C given a stressor W = w:
T EC = E[C|W = w] =

X

cij (1 − p((vi , vj )|W = w)) .

(vi ,vj )∈E
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Definition 2. Total expected number of node failures: Since the number of functional nodes is an important parameter for any network, we calculate the total expected number of node failures among N nodes after the occurrence of a stressor
event. We define a random variable that captures the functionality of the ith node
as follows

Xi =



1 if the ith node fails with probablity p(vi |W = w),

0 if the ith node is functional.

P
The total number of node failures can be expressed as XT = N
i=1 Xi . Then the
PN
total expected number of failed nodes is E[XT |W = w] = i=1 p(vi |W = w).
Definition 3. Max-flow between two nodes [28] : This parameter allows us to find
the maximum data rate possible between any two fixed nodes in a network.

3.3

Simulation results

For simulation, a three-level communication-network architecture is presented that
is scalable both in the number of levels as well as the size of the network in each level.
Figure 3.2 depicts a prototype of the physical infrastructure of a ML communication
network, which is composed of three real networks: TeliaSonera, Level 3 and Sprint.
The physical topology dataset of these three networks are available in [69]. Note
that each of TeliaSonera, Level 3 and Sprint networks consists of 21, 99 and 264
nodes, respectively, which are located all over USA. Three connections from both
Level 3 and Sprint network are made with the TeliaSonera network based on the
geographical distance between nodes and their associated node degrees. We have
evaluated the performance of the ML communication network under different types
of stressor scenarios. For each scenario we have generated 500 random samples with
2 stressor events. All links have a capacity of 1 Gbps (Gigabits per second) and

58

Chapter 3. Vulnerability of communication networks under physical attacks

Figure 3.2: A physical topology of a ML communication network composed of three
real networks: TeliaSonera, Level 3 and Sprint.

intermediate point distance on links is approximately 10 miles. Node tolerances are
assigned uniformly in (0, 2]. Moreover, the radius of the circular stressor is assumed
to be 200 miles. For a line stressor, the line-direction is considered to be a free
parameter within 0-360 degrees, since the line stressor can move to any direction
after its occurrence.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the total expected number of node failures and the
TEC of the ML network, respectively, for three different types of stressors. As expected, the TEC decreases and the total expected number of node failures increases
with the increase of the parameter value of stressor. Depending on the stressor, the
horizontal axis (parameter of the stressor ) refers to the variance of the Gaussian
stressor or the intensity at the center for circular stressor or the length of line for
linear stressor. Notice that the network performance becomes worse for all scenarios
while we consider the effect of SRLG among the network components. This is because one component failure contributes to the increase of failure probability of other
components (Observations 1 and 2). For the particular parameter values assumed in
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Figure 3.3: Total expected number of failed nodes in the network under different
types of stressors with (w) and without (w/o) SRLG effects.

Figure 3.4: TEC of the network under various stressors with and without SRLG.

simulation, the ML communication network is less vulnerable under Gaussian stressor; however, different parameter values may yield different results, which is intuitive.

Figure 3.5 illustrates the Max-flow between two arbitrary fixed nodes (denoted
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Figure 3.5: Maximum flow between two fixed nodes with SRLG.

by S and D in Fig. 3.2) in the network following a stressor. Here we have directly
calculated the Max-flow considering the SRLG. Clearly, Max-flow achievable between
these two nodes under normal operation is 3 Gbps, but due to the impact of stressors
some nodes/links fail, thus the actual Max-flow between these two nodes is reduced.

3.4

Summary and conclusions

The reliability of a ML network is largely affected by the catastrophic attacks and
natural disasters. In this chapter, we have described different types of correlated
stressors that can potentially degrade the reliability of a communication network. We
have also calculated the coupled-vulnerabilities among network components using a
realistic SRLG formulation. Simulation results have shown that the inherent coupling
among communication-network components notably increases their vulnerabilities to
the large-scale stressors.
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Resiliency of the multilevel
network under failure propagation

A communication network (e.g., military, private, commercial network) usually has
its own independent and secure network infrastructure. However, an independent
secure network may choose to connect with other networks to receive services and
use it as a redundant communication medium whenever needed. Therefore, interconnections among independent subnetworks are inevitable for various reasons including the seamless communication among users of different networks, expansion
of the communication capabilities among geographically-distant networks, backup
communications in case of failures in the primary network, etc. In particular, interconnectivity between a small-sized network (consisting of a smaller number of nodes
with lower link-bandwidth) and a large-sized network (consisting of a larger number of nodes with higher link-bandwidth) required for expanding the communication
range and data rate of the small network. For example, a wide range of commercial
and non-commercial communication systems and networks are used to support the
military communications [53].
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Owing to interconnections, the subnetworks of an ML network become interdependent through the communication gateways due to the exchange of information
among each other. However, different networks usually have distinct security policies,
control structures, and infrastructural vulnerabilities, as in the case of military and
commercial networks for example [13]. Therefore, interconnections in ML networks
can increase the vulnerability of a secure subnetwork due to threat propagation from
less secure subnetworks. As a result, the composition of the individually secure system with different security policies is not secure [12]. For example, due to different
levels of securities, the inter-operation and data sharing between military and commercial systems through interconnections may increase the probability of breaching
security of the military node [13]. Moreover, in a ML network, if a node in a subnetwork is compromised by attackers then there is a possibility that a node in the
other subnetwork may be compromised through the interconnected gateways. For
example, interconnecting a highly secure network with the public Internet results in
an increased vulnerability to the secure network by exposing it to cyber threats such
as injection of malwares (viruses, worms), packet sniffing, denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks (Section 1.6, [8]). In wireless networks, the internetwork links can be eavesdropped along with a strong possibility of jamming and sniffing [8, 70]. In fact, an
adversary may get access to the top-secret data [12], which they can use for their benefit, such as eavesdropping links among nodes to extract critical information, locate
the mobile nodes or military troops thus endanger their lives, traffic analysis [13],
etc.
Clearly, interconnectivity among subnetworks needs to be addressed in order to
compose an efficient and resilient ML network. In this work, we define the efficiency
of interconnectivity of a ML network and model the resiliency (vulnerability) of a
secure subnetwork due to the propagation of security risk through interconnections.
The dynamics of security risk propagation are captured by two models, namely the
evil-rain influence model [71] and the SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) model [72].
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In addition, we formulate two optimization problems that maximize the efficiency
of interconnectivity with a constraint on the vulnerability/resiliency. We use different network topologies and interconnection patterns in our simulation and find
the resiliency of a secure military network due to interconnections with vulnerable
commercial networks. Based on simulation data, we propose two parametric analytic
expressions in order to find the optimal number of interconnections that maximizes
the efficiency of the ML network under resiliency or vulnerability constraints.

4.1

Vulnerability of a secure network

We have found that the dynamics of security risk propagation among subnetworks
can be characterized by the existing evil-rain influence model and SIR epidemic
model. These models are also used to model the propagation of a threat/risk in a
network [38, 39]. Below we demonstrate how these two models are used to capture
the propagation of security risks among subnetworks through interconnections.

4.1.1

The SIR epidemic model

The epidemic model is a dynamical model that captures the spread of a disease
in a network of large populations [72]. Among different versions of the epidemic
model, we use the SIR model to characterize the dynamics of risk propagation in a
network. In the SIR model, all the nodes are susceptible to attack initially, as such
one or more nodes can be infected by attackers. The infected node compromises its
neighbors with a transmission probability, denoted by τ . Moreover, the infected node
will be recovered/removed at the following time step by the recovery mechanism of
the SIR model. In the SIR model, the resiliency of a network G with N nodes is
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defined as [38]
R(G) = 1 −

E[Nf ] − E[Ni ]
,
N − E[Ni ]

(4.1)

where E[extend of a cascade] is the average number of nodes eventually infected due
to the propagation of security risk from initially compromised nodes. Note that
0 ≤ R(G) ≤ 1, where R(G) is 0 if all nodes are compromised.
In our ML network, a node in a less secure subnetwork is attacked initially; then
the compromised node infects its neighbors with probability τ . Since the secure
subnetwork is also a part of the ML network, the attack also propagates to the
secure network.

4.1.2

The evil-rain influence model

The influence model is a networked Markov Chain (MC) framework for modeling
interactions among nodes in a network. The internal functional dynamics of each
node is captured by an MC and the influence received by a node from its neighbor
is between 0 and 1, with the total influence received by a node from all its neighbors
summing up to 1 [71]. A special case of the influence model is the “evil-rain model,”
where two autonomous external nodes, named “source of failures” and “source of
repairs,” are responsible for injecting failures and reparation in the network, respectively. We model the risk propagation from one node to other node through influences
between the nodes; i.e., the probability of propagation of risk between two nodes is
equal to the influence among them.
In a network G with N nodes, the expected number of compromised node (vulnerability) is given by [71]
V (G) = 1T (I − F)−1 u,

(4.2)
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where u is an N -dimensional vector that represents the external attack probability
of each node, 1 is a column vector where all elements are 1, and I is an N × N
identity matrix. Moreover, F is the interconnection
that represents influ structure 
F F F
 11 12 13 


ences between nodes as (for 3 subnetworks): F = F21 F22 F23 , where Fij denotes


F31 F32 F33
the interconnection matrix between subnetwork i and j. Fij (l, k) = 0 indicates that
there is no connection between the lth node of network i and kth node network j.
Moreover, Fij (l, k) = c, 0 < c ≤ 1, implies that there is a connection with influence
strength c between the lth node of network i and kth node network j. The higher
the value of strength c the easier is the propagation of security risk from a compromised node to its neighbor, which could be, for instance, due to the lack of security
solutions installed in their interface.
Similar to the resiliency in the SIR model, we define the resiliency as the fraction
of nodes that are not compromised:
R(G) := 1 −

4.2

V (G)
.
N

(4.3)

Maximizing interconnectivity in ML networks

In this section, we maximize the efficiency of interconnectivity of a ML network under
the resiliency and vulnerability constraints.

4.2.1

Efficiency of interconnectivity

Recall that the interconnectivity among different types of networks is essential for
communicating outside their territory, redundant communication medium, etc., thus
forming the ML network. The efficiency of connectivity among nodes for a network
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G with N nodes is [73]
W (G) =

X X
1
1
,
N (N − 1) u∈V
d(u, v)

(4.4)

v∈V −{u}

where V is the set of N nodes, d(u, v) is the shortest path distance between node u
and v and g is the attenuation of the connection which is assumed to be 1. In words,
W (G) is the efficiency of information exchange among nodes over the network. The
efficiency of connection between node u and v is inversely proportional to the shortest
path distance between them. Note that, d(u, v) = ∞ implies there is no connection
between node u and v, and d(u, v) = 1 implies there is a direct connection between
u and v. In addition, with no connections among any nodes W (G) = 0 i.e., no node
can communicate with other nodes in G. Interconnections enable communications
among nodes (e.g., in a network where all nodes are directly connected with each
other, W (G) = 1).
As we are interested in the interconnectivity among subnetworks, we define the
efficiency of interconnectivity of a ML network Gm as
Ŵ (Gm ) := W (Gm ) − W (G0 ),

(4.5)

where G0 represents the ML network without any interconnections among the subnetworks.

4.2.2

Interconnectivity optimization

Since different mathematical formulations are used in the SIR and evil-rain model for
modeling the dynamics of risk propagation, we formulate two optimization problems
based on these two models, which are described below.
First, for the SIR model, we maximize the efficiency of interconnectivity with a
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constraint on the resiliency as
max Ŵ (Gm ) subject to R(Gs ) ≥ Rs ,

eij ,i6=j

(4.6)

where Rs is the minimum resiliency that is required for a secure subnetwork Gs ,
eij ∈ {0, 1} represents the connection between node i and j, Gm is the ML network.
Similarly, using the evil-rain model we maximize the efficiency of interconnectivity
under the vulnerability constraint,
max Ŵ (Gm ) subject to V (Gs ) ≤ Vs ,

Fij ,i6=j

(4.7)

where Vs is the maximum vulnerability of the secure subnetwork Gs , Fij is defined
in the previous section and here i 6= j since we optimize interconnection between
different networks.
Note that, both optimization problems given by (4.6) and (4.7) are nonlinear and
non-convex, for which no simple closed-form analytical solution or optimal algorithm
exists. However, we recur to data from the numerical simulations in order to solve
these optimization problems parametrically, which is demonstrated in the following
section.

4.3

Numerical simulation

In this section, we introduce several network topologies and interconnection patterns
followed by a description of the generation of ML network. We then find the efficiency
of interconnectivity and resiliency for different number and patterns of interconnections using both SIR and evil-rain model and propose our parametric models based
on simulation data.
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4.3.1

Network topologies and interconnection patterns

We have considered different types of state-of-the-art network graphs to form a ML
network. Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph [72]: ER graphs are random graphs where
each node connects to other nodes independently with a given probability. Barbasi
and Albert (BA) graph [72]: In a BA graph, each new node connects with some
given number (a constant) of nodes with preferential attachment, which results in
a scale-free graph. Telia Carrier (TC) network: TC network is a real-world
physical network topology with 21 nodes and 25 links, which are located over the
USA [69].
We have used following link patterns to simulate the interconnectivity among
subnetworks. Assortative Link (AL): Here the nodes with highest-degrees in one
subnetwork connects to the nodes with highest-degree nodes in the other subnetwork,
and so on. Disassortative Link (DL): The highest-degree nodes in one subnetwork
connect to the nodes with the lowest-degree in the other subnetwork. Random
Link (RL): Here connections among nodes are assigned randomly between two
subnetworks. 1-1 Link (1-1): Nodes are connected with shortest physical distances,
i.e., a node in one subnetwork connects with the closest node in other subnetworks.

4.3.2

Multilevel network generation

We generate a 3-level network similar to the one shown in Fig. 1.1. When all three
constituent subnetworks of the 3-level network are the ER graph, we denote it as the
ER-ER-ER network. Similarly, we form the BA-BA-BA network and the ER-TC-BA
network. The physical topology graph of the TC network can be found in [69]. Since
the TC network has 21 nodes, we have used 21 nodes for generating the BA and
ER network. Moreover, the TC network is an connected graph and we generate the
BA and ER networks so that these networks are also form two connected graphs.
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In particular, for ER network, we assign edges between nodes with probability p
such that the generated graph is an connected graph (here we use p = 0.18 and
check whether the graph is connected). An connected BA graph is formed by using
the algorithm proposed in [74] with an average node-degree equal to 3.2 and powerlaw exponent is 2.8. As shown in Fig. 1.1, we assume the level-1 network is the
highly secure military network, whereas level-2 and level-3 networks are commercial
networks with a lower level of security. While interconnecting these subnetworks to
form a 3-level network, we have used the same number of interconnections to connect
the military network with two commercial networks. The connection patterns are
AL, DL, RL, and 1-1. Here, two commercial networks are used as two backup
communication infrastructures for the military network, which can be scaled to any
number of networks.

4.3.3

Simulation results

First, we discuss the simulation results of the SIR model. To simulate the SIR model,
we assume a node in the less secure subnetwork (commercial network) is attacked
(compromised) initially. Then the compromised node propagates the security threats
to its neighbors in the 3-level network with a probability τ . Resiliency (R(G)) is
calculated by using (4.1), where E[extend of a cascade] is computed by averaging
over 1000 realizations of the SIR model with one initial failure.
Figure 4.1 shows the resiliency of the military network versus the number of
interconnections for the ER-ER-ER, BA-BA-BA and ER-TC-BA network. Here the
resiliency decreases as we increase the number of interconnections. This is because
with more interconnections the risk easily propagates to the military network from
commercial networks. Observe that the DL connection performs better than the AL
connection, which is due to the fact that the military nodes with smaller degrees
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are connected to commercial nodes. Hence, even if an interconnected military node
is compromised, due to its smaller degree the probability of compromising many
neighbors is low.

Figure 4.2 shows the efficiency of interconnectivity of the 3-level network for different number of interconnections, which can be computed by (4.5). Here, as we
increase the number of interconnections the efficiency of interconnectivity increases
due to new communication paths between subnetworks. Moreover, with AL connection the efficiency of interconnectivity of the 3-level network is higher than that for
the DL connection, which is due to the higher node-degrees of the interconnected
nodes.

The vulnerability versus the efficiency of interconnectivity for three ML networks
is shown in Fig. 4.3. The vulnerability of the military network increases with the
efficiency of the network. Moreover, for any given efficiency the higher the value of τ ,
the vulnerability becomes higher due to the larger transmission probability of risks
from the compromised nodes.

Finally, Fig. 4.4 shows the results using the evil-rain model for the ER-ER-ER
network due to space limitations. As described in the model, here commercial networks have the “source of failures” with a given probability (0.20 in the simulation),
thus failures start from the commercial network and propagate to the military network. However, the military network has the “source of repairs” with a probability
(0.20 in the simulation), which prevents the failure of complete network. We can
observe the similar trend as in the SIR model. Thus we conclude that the interconnection increases vulnerability of the secure military network. At the same time, the
efficiency of interconnectivity among subnetworks also increases.
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4.3.4

Parametric model for the resiliency and efficiency

Motivated by the observed trends in the simulation data, we propose two parametric
models for the efficiency of interconnectivity and resiliency for any given number of
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Figure 4.4: Simulation results using the evil-rain influence model for the ER-ER-ER
network

interconnection. From Fig. 4.1, observe that the resiliency is approximately linear
with respect to the number of interconnections. We propose a parametric expression
for the resiliency (R(τ, G)) with l number of interconnections as,
R(τ, G) = a(τ, G) + lb(τ, G),

(4.8)

where a(τ, G), b(τ, G) are two parameters estimated from simulation data, G represents the network graph, τ is the transmission probability. We obtained the following values of the optimally fitted parameters: a = 0.997, b = −0.007 (ER-ER-ER
network), a = 0.998, b = −0.017 (BA-BA-BA network), a = 1.001, b = −0.005
(ER-TC-BA network), which were then used to generate the fitted lines in the Fig.
4.5(a).
Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 4.2, the efficiency of interconnectivity follows a
nonlinear relationship with the number of interconnection (l), which we approximate
as the following,
Ŵ (τ, G) = α(τ, G)lβ(τ,G) + γ(τ, G).

(4.9)

Here the values of optimally fitted parameters: α = 0.0828, β = 0.2984, γ = −4 ×
10−4 (ER-ER-ER network); α = 0.0959, β = 0.2678, γ = −3.2 × 10−3 (BA-BA-BA
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network); α = 0.0854, β = 0.2678, γ = −4.7 × 10−5 (ER-TC-BA network); which
were then used to find the fitted lines in the Fig. 4.5(b).
The values of parameters in (4.8) and (4.9) are computed by fitting the simulation
data so as to minimize the overall mean-square-error (MSE). Higher-order polynomials with added complexities might yield more accurate fitting of the data. Apart
from the complexity, the higher-order polynomials might over-fit the data points
which is a serious drawback for prediction [75]. Therefore, we trade-off the complexity with slight inaccuracy to keep the model simple and avoid possible over-fitting
error. Note that we have derived the parametric model for the SIR model due to
space constraints. However, the model parameters can also be tuned for the evil-rain
influence model as both models show qualitatively similar trends.
Our parametric models have great importance in deriving key insights. For instance, based on the given constraints (resiliency or vulnerability), one can obtain
the number of interconnections by (4.8) and corresponding efficiency of interconnectivity by (4.9), that solves both optimization problems. One can also compute the
efficiency of the ML network and resiliency of a secure network provided the num-
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ber of interconnections. Moreover, the solution is independent of interconnection
patterns (AL, DL, RL, 1-1) assuming the MSE tolerance.

4.4

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we have analyzed the dynamics of risk propagation in ML networks
using the SIR epidemic model and evil-rain influence model. It is shown that increasing the number of interconnections among subnetworks results in a nonlinear
increase of efficiency of the ML network; however, interconnectivity also decreases the
resiliency of a secure network linearly. In order to maximize the efficiency of interconnection under resiliency/vulnerability constraints, we have proposed two parametric
models. These models can be used to find the number of interconnections for exchanging information within the ML network when some subnetworks are vulnerable
to security attacks.
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Chapter 5
Dynamics of communication
network under the influence of
power failure

In the previous chapter, we did not consider failures in other infrastructures, such
as the power grid, supplying electricity for the communication network, which is
not true in reality. Modern network infrastructures are known to be interdependent
due to the service they receive from each other [43]. For example, smart grids are
dependent on the communication network due to the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) system. On the other hand, communication networks rely on
the power grids for their power supply. Similar interdependencies exist in other
networks such as traffic systems, water networks, airline networks, water transport
networks and sewer networks.
The physical infrastructures of the communication network are known to be vulnerable to various large-scale failures. Different types of natural disasters and attacks
(e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), high-altitude
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electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs), etc.) can directly damage the critical network components such as switches, routers, amplifiers, electro-optical converters, fiber-optic
line driver modules, receiver boxes, etc. [76]. Some real examples of catastrophic
disasters that cause a massive infrastructural destruction of communication network
include hurricane Katarina in USA and Mexico (2005), earthquake in Taiwan (2006),
wildfires in California (2007), rail tunnel fire in Baltimore (2001), 9/11 attack that
caused damage of telecommunication hub near world trade center [77, 78]. In addition, a strong electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by an HEMP, can produce
high electrical currents within a short period of time. Such electrical pulses might get
coupled with long-haul metallic conductor lines (e.g., landline communication systems, undersea optical fiber with copper power line, etc.) and fail the components
connected to those lines [76, 79, 80].

The above mentioned initial failures can affect the failures of other network components inside a communication network in several ways: a) if all the neighboring
nodes of a node fail then the node becomes disconnected from the network (or from
the giant component), which implies that it is no longer playing a significant role
in the network communication and can be considered as failed [20]; b) an HEMP
wave that hampers a node due to high electrical current that can be carried through
the links and may fail the neighboring communication nodes [76]; c) node removal
(failure) can overload the other nodes, that in turn, might induce congestion in the
communication networks [81]. For instance, congestion-induced Internet collapse was
occurred in October 1986, when the speed of the connection between the Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory and the University of California at Berkeley, which are located
only 200 meter apart, dropped by a factor of 100 [10]. As such, the failure of a communication node inside a network might influence functionality of the neighboring
nodes. These types of influences among the communication nodes are termed as the
intra-network influence.
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Moreover, all communication nodes need power (direct or backup) to stay functional, therefore, the vulnerability of power networks can directly affect the supporting power supply components of the communication networks and can interrupt the
functionality of the communication components. For example, due to northeastern
USA and Canada blackout on 14–16 August 2003, 3175 communication networks
of 1700 organizations (business entities, government, education, etc.) suffered from
abnormal connectivity (voice/data) outages [11]. In addition, when a direct power
supply is not available, assume a battery changes its state from functional to nonfunctional with a certain probability due to changes its internal state. As a result
the communication components that are relying on batteries will be influenced by
such a change of state, and therefore will have a higher probability of changing to the
non-functional state. For instance, due to mismanagement of backup power supplies,
the Delta airlines data center failure occurred on August 8th , 2016, that causes cancellation of more than 300 flights, inconveniencing hundreds of thousands of people
all over the world and costing Delta Airlines an estimated 150 million dollar [82]. In
this work, we termed these influences as the inter-network influence.
Apart from the failure influences described above, in a repairable network the
normal functionality of a component can increase the probability of proper functionality of its neighbors. It can also influence the repair-ability of a failed component
with some probability. For example, functional nodes can share traffic with each
other and can reduce the probability of overloading (congestion) of a communication
node due to high traffic.
It is clear from above discussion that the role of both intra- and inter-dependencies
should be taken into account to capture actual functional dynamics in a communication network. In this work, we develop a dynamical stochastic model to analyze
the failure dynamics in a communication network considering both intra- and interdependency that exist in cyber-physical systems. The intra-dependency among com-
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munication nodes is captured using the influence model. The inter-dependency of the
communication network with the supporting power supply infrastructures is modeled
using an independent influence from each power node to the corresponding communication node. Under both influences, we derive an analytical closed-form equation to
evaluate the steady-state probability of the communication network nodes. Numerical simulation has been carried out using a Sprint communication network topology
to demonstrate the vulnerability of the communication network under intra-influence
among communication nodes and the inter-influence from the supporting power supply nodes.

5.1

5.1.1

Influence model for network functionality

Influence model

Influence model is a networked Markov chain framework where the state evolution
of each node in the network depends upon its internal Markov chain as well as the
state of its neighbors and their influences on the node [71, 83]. Here we describe the
influence among communication nodes nodes by a simple example. Figure 5.1 shows
the network infrastructure for the communication network with six nodes considering
power nodes (batteries) as a special node for the supporting power supply. Notice
that the network of interest consists of two types of nodes: communication nodes,
denoted by n1 , n2 , ..., n6 , and power nodes denoted by b1 , b2 , ..., b6 . There are two
types of independent influences. First, the intra-network influence, i.e., the influence
among communication nodes. Assuming uniform influence among all communication
nodes for the network shown in Figure 5.1, we can express the intra-network influence
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Figure 5.1: An example of the influence model for the communication network with
power nodes.
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where Dcij is the influence received by ith communication node from the jth communication node. However, the Dc matrix does not capture the power influence on the
communication node (inter-network influence), which we described in the following
subsection.

5.1.2

Interdependent influence model

The influence model requires the sum of all the influences imposed on a node to be
one. Consider a network where a communication node is influenced by its neighbors
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as well as the state of the supporting power node. According to the influence model,
the total influence needs to be distributed between the power and communication
nodes. As a result, even though the supporting power node fails there is still some
probability that the communication node will be functional. However, in reality
we know that if the supporting power node (direct power or battery) fails then the
communication node fails certainly [20]. In particular, the backup supplies (e.g., battery, storage energy) provide power to the corresponding communication nodes for
their normal operation when main power source fails by WMDs, HEMPs, or natural
disasters. If a backup supply is working then the functionality of the corresponding communication node will depend on the intra-network influence. Whenever the
backup supply fails the corresponding communication node will fail too. This scenarios cannot be captured by the traditional influence model. To consider this power
influence, we model two separate influences on a communication node: a) intranetwork influence (captures the influences among communication networks and adds
up to one) and b) inter-network influence (captures the influence from the power
node to the communication node and adds up to one). These two influences imposed
on a communication node can independently fail a communication node. Interdependent influence model captures both intra- and inter-influences that can affect the
functionality of a communication node in a communication network.

5.2

Failure dynamics in interdependent influence
model

We assume finitely many nodes and denote the functionality status of ith node,
i ∈ {1, ..., N }, as 0 if the node is off/failed and 1 if the node is on/functional. We
represent the state of the ith communication node at time k without the power influence as ni [k]. Similarly, bi [k] denotes the state of the ith power node at time k. And
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Table 5.1: Functionality state (si [k]) of the ith communication node considering
power influence
ni [k] bi [k] si [k]
0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

si [k] represents state of the ith communication node at time k with power influence.
To make the analysis simpler, we assign the same self influence Db to all power nodes;
however, Db can be node dependent (we omit explicit node dependence).
Since the state of a communication node depends on its internal state and the
state of the corresponding power node, we define si [k] as
si [k] = ni [k]bi [k].

(5.1)

Using (5.1), the state of the ith communication node with power influence, si [k], can
be expressed as shown in table 5.1.

5.2.1

Modeling initial failures in communication networks

Recall that, initial failures in communication networks and power nodes occur due to
large-scale stressors such as intensional attacks or natural disasters. At time k = 0,
following a stressor event W = w (e.g., WMD, HEMP), the conditional expectation
of the ith communication node’s state is given by




E si [0] W = w = P(si [0] = 1|W = w) = E ni [0]bi [0] W = w

 

= E ni [0] W = w E bi [0] W = w
= P(ni [0] = 1 W = w)P(bi [0] = 1 W = w),
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where P(·) defines the probability of an event. The 3rd line follows from the fact that
at time k = 0 given a stressor W = w, the failure probability of all nodes are mutually
independent [29]. The initial failure/survival probability, P(si [0] = 1 W = w), under
a stressor (attack/disaster) event can be found from a model that captures the impact
of the stressors

p(vi |W = w) = min


Iw (xi , yi )
,1 ,
Ivi (r, c)

(5.3)

where Iw (xi , yi ) ≥ 0 captures the aggregated intensity of stressor at node vi ’s location
(xi , yi ), and Ivi (r, c) > 0 is the internal node tolerance (please refer to the chapter 3
for details).

5.2.2

Evolution of the state probabilities

In this subsection, we analyze the stochastic dynamics of the communication network by looking at the evolution of the node state probabilities. Note that, having
determined P(si [0] = 1 W = w) using (5.2), the initial state of all communication
nodes at time k = 0 can be simulated independently using corresponding probability
of the nodes. Assembling initial states for all N nodes, we express the state vector
iT
h
for all communication nodes at time k = 0 as s[0] = s1 [0] s2 [0] ... sN [0] , where
T is the matrix transpose operator.
Next, in order to find the state of ith communication node with power influence at


time k = 1, we need to know P(si [1] = 1), which is E si [1] . We adopt the recursive
relation between the current states and previous states, but with the newly added


power influence. First, we proceed to find E si [1]|s[0] = P(si [1] s[0]) as follows




E si [1] s[0] = E ni [1]bi [1] s[0]

 

= E ni [1] s[0] E bi [1] s[0]
= dTi s[0]P(bi [1] = 1|s[0]),
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where (5.4b) follows from the fact that ni [1] and bi [1] are independent given s[0]. Also


in (5.4c), E ni [1] s[0] = dTi s[0], is due to the influence in communication network
from previous states, where dTi is the ith row of the Dc matrix. Specifically (5.4c)
states that the conditional probability of ith node to be functional at time instant
k = 1 is equal to the sum of influences from all the functional nodes times functional
probability of the corresponding power node at that time.
Note that P(bi [1] = 1|s[0]) needs to be calculated in order to compute (5.4). We
use the following lemma to find it.

Lemma 5.2.1. P(bi [1] = 1|s[0]) = Db P(bi [0] = 1).
Proof. Recall that the power nodes do not depend on the communication nodes.
Therefore, bi [1] can be found from its previous state bi [0], which we do not know
directly given s[0]. Hence, we apply the law of total probability to find
P(bi [1] = 1|s[0]) = P(bi [1] = 1|si [0])

(5.5)

= P(bi [1] = 1|si [0] = 1)P(si [0] = 1) + P(bi [1] = 1|si [0] = 0)P(si [0] = 0).
For the first term in (5.5), observe from the Table I that {si [0] = 1} = {bi [0] =
1, ni [0] = 1}. Therefore, P(bi [1] = 1|si [0] = 1) = P(bi [1] = 1|{bi [0] = 1, ni [0] = 1}) =

p bi [1] = 1|bi [0] = 1 = Db , since a power node only influences itself. For the second
term in (5.5), we have
P(bi [1] = 1|si [0] = 0) =

X

P(bi [1] = 1, bi [0] = b|si [0] = 0)

b∈{0,1}

=

X

P(bi [1] = 1|si [0] = 0, bi [0] = b)P(bi [0] = b|si [0] = 0)

b∈{0,1}

=

X

(5.6)
P(bi [1] = 1|bi [0] = b)P(bi [0] = b|si [0] = 0)

b∈{0,1}

=

X

Db P(bi [0] = b|si [0] = 0) = Db P(bi [0] = 1|si [0] = 0).

b∈{0,1}
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With above results we can rewrite (5.5) as
P(bi [1] = 1|s[0]) = P(bi [1] = 1|si [0])

(5.7a)

= Db P(si [0] = 1) + Db P(bi [0] = 1|si [0] = 0)P(si [0] = 0)

= Db P(si [0] = 1) + P(bi [0] = 1, si [0] = 0)

= Db P(bi [0] = 1, ni [0] = 1) + P(bi [0] = 1, ni [0] = 0)

(5.7b)

(5.7d)

= Db P(bi [0] = 1),

(5.7e)

(5.7c)

where (5.7c) follows from Bayes rules and (5.7d) is due to the fact that: {si [0] =
1} = {bi [0] = 1, ni [0] = 1}, and {bi [0] = 1, si [0] = 0} = {bi [0] = 1, ni [0] = 0}.
By substituting (5.7) into (5.4) we obtain




E si [1] s[0] = dTi s[0] × Db P(bi [0] = 1) = dTi s[0] × Db E bi [0] .

(5.8)

Similarly, we can find the state of all communication nodes at time k = 1 and
express those states in a vector form:

 
 

T
T
 d1 s[0] × Db E[b1 [0]]   Db E[b1 [0]]   d1 s[0] 

 
 


  dT2 s[0] × Db E[b2 [0]]   Db E[b2 [0]]   dT2 s[0] 

◦
=
E s[1] s[0] = 
..
..
  .. 
 






. 
.
.

 

 
T
T
dN s[0]
Db E[bN [0]]
dN s[0] × Db E[bN [0]]


 
T
 E[b1 [0]] 
 d1 


 
 E[b2 [0]]  T  dT2 



 
= D b 
..
 1 ◦  ..  s[0]


 . 
.


 
E[bN [0]]
dTN





= Db (E b[0] 1T ) ◦ Dc s[0] = Db E b[0] ◦ (Dc s[0]),

(5.9)

where ◦ denotes the entry-wise/Hadamard product and 1 denotes all column vector
with all elements 1.
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Following same procedure as detailed above, we can obtain the state of the ith
communication node at time k = 2 as follows
h 
i



E si [2] s[0] = E E si [2] s[1] s[0]
h
i


T
= E di s[1] × Db E bi [1] s[0]


= Db E[bi [1]] × dTi E s[1] s[0]

= Db E[bi [1]] × dTi Db E[b[0]] ◦ (Dc s[0]) ,

(5.10a)
(5.10b)
(5.10c)
(5.10d)

where (5.10a) we used smoothing property of conditional expectation, (5.10b) and
(5.10d) are follow from (5.8) and (5.9), respectively. Next, as done in (5.9), we can
write the state vector of all communication nodes at time k = 2 as


T
 Db E[b1 [1]] × d1 Db E[b[0]] ◦ (Dc s[0]) 



  Db E[b2 [1]] × dT2 Db E[b[0]] ◦ (Dc s[0]) 


E s[2] s[0] = 
..



.



Db E[bN [1]] × dTN Db E[b[0]] ◦ (Dc s[0])


T
 Db E[b1 [1]]d1 


 Db E[b2 [1]]dT2  
 
 Db (E[b[0]]1T ) ◦ Dc s[0]
=
..




.
(5.11)


Db E[bN [1]]dTN

  
T
T
 E[b1 [1]]1   d1  !

  
 E[b2 [1]]1T   dT2  
 
T

◦ 
= Db 
D
(E[b[0]]1
)
◦
D
s[0]
b
c
..
  .. 

  . 
.

  
E[bN [1]]1T
dTN


= Db2 (E[b[1]]1T ) ◦ Dc (E[b[0]]1T ) ◦ Dc s[0].
Generalizing for all k ≥ 0 we have
h




E s[k + 1] s[0] = Dbk+1 (E[b[k]]1T ) ◦ Dc (E[b[k − 1]]1T ) ◦ Dc

i
T
T
... (E[b[1]]1 ) ◦ Dc (E[b[0]]1 ) ◦ Dc s[0].
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To simplify (5.12) and express it using only the initial state, we find E b[k] , k > 0,
as


E bi [k] = P(bi [k] = 1)
h 
i
= E E bi [k] bi [k − 1]


= E Db bi [k − 1]


= Dbk E bi [0] ,

(5.13a)
(5.13b)
(5.13c)
(5.13d)

where (5.13b) is due to the smoothing property of conditional expectation, and
(5.13d) is the result of applying smoothing property repeatedly. Repeating (5.13)
for all i and expressing (5.13) in matrix form we have




E b[k] 1T = Dbk E b[0]1T .

(5.14)

Finally, by substituting (5.14) into (5.12) we obtain


E s[k + 1] s[0]
h




=Dbk+1 (Dbk E b[0]1T ) ◦ Dc (Dbk−1 E [b[0]] 1T ) ◦ Dc ...

i
(Db1 E [b[0]] 1T ) ◦ Dc (Db0 E[b[0]]1T ) ◦ Dc s[0]


k+1
(k+1)(k+2)/2
= Db
(E b[0] 1T ) ◦ Dc
s[0].

(5.15)

If we assume Db = 1, which means that a power node receives full influence from
its previous state only, then in the limit as k → ∞ (5.15) can be expressed as


k+1
lim E s[k + 1] s[0] = lim (E[b[0]]1T ) ◦ Dc
s[0]
k→∞
k→∞


0,
0 ≤ E[b[0]] < 1
=



1π T s[0], E b[0] = 1,
c

(5.16)

where π c is the left eigenvector of Dc and is normalized to 1; the justification for this
limit is given below.
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The result given by (5.16) gives us the steady state probability of each communication node considering impact of the corresponding power node. For a connected
network that results in an ergodic network influence matrix, all nodes in the binary influence model always reach a consensus state: all zeros or all ones (Theorem
3.6 [71]). Here, (5.16) gives us a new but intuitive conclusion: when all the batteries
are always functional, the functionality of communication nodes only influenced by
their intra-influence; whereas, when all batteries have some positive probability of
initial failure, then all the communication nodes will eventually fail. Equations (5.1)
- (5.16) results in next theorem which incorporates the influence of batteries in a
communication network.
Theorem 5.2.2. Assume a connected communication network (i.e., ergodic network
matrix Dc ) that has associated power node with each communication node. Also assume that s[0] is the initial state of all communication nodes with the power influence
and π c is the normalized left eigenvector of Dc . Then all the communication nodes
will eventually fail if all the power nodes have some positive initial failure probabilities. However, if all the power nodes are always functional then all the communication

nodes will survive (fail) with equal probability given by π Tc s[0] 1 − π Tc s[0] .

5.3

Simulation results

Figure 5.2 depicts the physical topology of the Sprint network given in [69]. Sprint
network consists of 264 nodes and 313 links, which are located all over United States
of America (USA) as shown in Fig. 2. We have used this real network topology
to validate our analytical model that captures the influences among communication
nodes as well as power nodes to track the failure dynamics in communication network.
The influence among the network nodes are defined based on the degree of the nodes.
For example, if a node has degree d then the influences it receives from its neighbors
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Figure 5.2: Topology of the Sprint network.

are given by 1/(d + 1). The addition of 1 in the denominator with d is due to the
self-loop influence. We find the steady state of the network (all communication nodes
functional/non-functional) using Monte-Carlo simulation. All results are averaged
over 1000 experiments with 5000 time steps in each experiment. Here we define the
failure of all communication nodes as the network failure.
At first, we assume that all power nodes are “on” throughout the time, i.e.,


when E b[0] = 1, to show the impact of intra-influences among communication
nodes. (5.16) demonstrates the case when all node power nodes are “on”, the steady
state of the communication nodes depends on eigenvector of Dc (i.e., intra-influences
among communication nodes) and initial states of communication nodes. Earlier
in this section, we define Dc based on the node-degrees. Here, the initial failure
probabilities of all the communication nodes are drawn from an uniform distribution
form {[0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.2], ... , [0.9, 1]}. Uniform distribution accounts for various
stressor intensities imposed on the communication nodes based on their relative
distance from the stressor center as well as tolerance to the stressors. In addition, we
use different ranges of the initial failure probabilities to model stressors with various
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attack strengths. Fig. 5.3 shows the probability of network failure versus average
initial failure probability of all communication nodes. As we can see the Monte Carlo
simulation result matches closely with our theoretical result given in (5.16). In other
words, when all the power nodes are always functional, the network failure probability
due to intra-influences and initial failures found in (5.16) validated by the simulation


results. In addition, when E b[0] < 1 (for any non-zero initial failure probabilities of
all power nodes), network failure will occur almost surely at the steady state, which is
shown in Fig. 5.3. Recall that, this is due to propagation of the initial power failures
through their inter-influences to corresponding communication nodes. Knowing that
the inter-influences will cause network failure at steady state, we look at the time
taken for the network to go to the steady state for different initial failure probabilities
of power nodes. This steady state reaching time metric will allow network operator to
estimate the time they will get before the complete network failure based intensity
of attacks/disasters, take proactive actions to prevent this network collapse. As
considered for communication nodes, we assigned uniform initial failure probabilities
to the power nodes. Fig. 5.4 illustrates that the time to network failure decreases
with the increase of the initial power failure probability. Furthermore, the larger
initial failure probabilities of the communication nodes (denoted by pn ) accelerates
faster failure of the network. We can see that larger initial damage by catastrophic
stressors can cause failure of the network at a faster rate, which becomes worse when
both communication and power nodes vulnerable to attack. Therefore, making at
least one of the infrastructures robust against massive disasters we can prolong the
time of network collapse.
Earlier results in this Section demonstrate the cases of complete network failures considering impact of intra and inter-influences. As described in Section I, in a
repairable network intra-influences among communication nodes can reduce overloading neighboring nodes. To incorporate repair-ability, we assign an ergodic transition
matrix to each communication nodes. This added repair-ability feature can prevent
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Figure 5.3: Validation of theoretical result by Monte-Carlo simulation: probability
of network
failure considering impact of initial communication node failures. For

E b[0] = 1, intra-influences among communication nodes are responsible initial
failure propagation and results in network
failure, which is proportional to initial

failure probabilities. When E b[0] < 1, inter-influences from power nodes cause
network failures for any average initial communication failure probabilities.
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Figure 5.4: Time steps needed for network failure (with intra-influences and interinfluences) based on different average initial failure probabilities of power nodes.

the complete network failure as demonstrated below by simulation. 5.5 depicts the
distribution of number of communication node failures considering both intra- and
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Distribution of number of failed communication nodes
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of number of communication node failures with intra influences only and with both with intra- and inter-influences considering repair-ability
of the communication nodes.

inter-influences.
loss generality, in the simulation we use an arbitrary tran Without 
0.95 0.05
) for all communication nodes, where first and 2nd states
sition matrix (
0.80 0.20
are functional and failed states of communication nodes, respectively. We can see
that without inter-influences (solid line: no initial power node failure) distribution
has mean failures of 15 communication nodes which are due to intra-influences in
communication networks, whereas with inter-influences the mean shifted to larger
value (156 and 252 for two cases); however, network does not got to complete failure
state due to repair-ability that propagates in the network through intra-influences.

5.4

Summary and conclusions

The initial failure of a communication node can occur in two ways: direct failure of
the communication node by a stressor or due to the power outage (direct supply or
stored energy it requires for its operation). These initial failures can cause failures of
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neighboring network components due to their inherit dependency on each other. We
have proposed a dynamical model to track the functionality of the communication
network following a destructive event. Our model captures intra-dependency among
communication nodes as well as the power influence on the communication node to
analyze the failure dynamics in communication networks. We provide a tractable
mathematical framework to predict the functionality state of the communication
network in steady state. We conclude that both intra- and inter-dependencies are
responsible for propagating failures in communication networks.
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A data-driven model for simulating
the line failure in power grids

The power grid is a critical infrastructure in our society as almost all of our activities
rely on electrical power. However, power grids are failure-prone. Man-made attacks
such as weapons of mass destruction, high-altitude electromagnetic pulses, and natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc., can cause damage
to critical components of any physical infrastructure [84]. For a power-grid, these
include failures of transmission lines, generators, and transformers. For instance,
in 2003 the initial failure of transmission lines and generating units contributed to
extensive power blackouts in the United States and Canada [85]. Besides, power
generation and consumption must be balanced for stable operation of a power grid.
Initial failures can instigate instability, which, in turn, may cause additional failures
(generally transmission lines and generators), and so on. Moreover, failures in communication network and human operator’s error may contribute to propagate the
initial failures [86, 87]. This phenomenon of continuing and uncontrolled successive
failures of grid components is termed as a cascading failure [49].
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A cascading failure in the power grid is a complex process due to a large number of
components, physical attributes, and operating parameters governing the operation
of the grid. For example, by considering only two parameters, namely, load growth
and power fluctuations, it was shown in [88] that a cascading failure may result
in an abrupt breakdown of a power grid. Moreover, in [89] the authors showed
that cascading failures cannot be exactly captured by graph-theoretic epidemic and
percolation models. The reason is that whenever a transmission line fails the next
line failure can occur anywhere in the power grid, not necessarily at the neighboring
lines, as typically assumed in an epidemic model. Real-world power outages also
exhibit such noncontiguous line failure propagation [90, 91].
In addition to the noncontiguous nature of the transmission line outages, it has
been observed that the failure of high-capacity transmission lines usually has a higher
impact on the propagation of cascading failures in a power grid than the failure of
low-capacity lines [92]. In fact, the system is designed to better protect these highcapacity lines. Hence, it becomes important to relate the propagation of transmission
line failures in the power grids to the capacities of the failed lines. In this work,
we recur to data from optimal DC power-flow simulations in order to characterize
the evolution of cascading failures by also taking into account the capacities of the
transmission lines. We perform numerical simulations on the IEEE 118 bus system
using MATPOWER [93] under various operating conditions. Then we propose a
parametric model that captures the dynamics of the evolution of transmission line
failure in a power grid. With the proposed parametric model, we keep track of
failures through lines of different capacities.
This chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of the relevant cascading
failure models from the literature is given in Section 1.2.5 . In Section 6.1, we present
the simulation data generated by MATPOWER on the IEEE 118 bus system. The
proposed parametric model is introduced and elaborated in Section 6.2. In Section
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6.3, we compare the results obtained from the model with real-world data. Our
conclusions and future work are presented in Section 6.4.

6.1

Simulation data

We have used MATPOWER (a MATLAB package) [93] to simulate cascading failures by solving optimal DC power-flow equations on the IEEE 118 bus system. The
optimal power-flow solution by MATPOWER is a quasi-static approach for simulating the cascading failures in the power grid, which is extensively used in the
literature [41, 94, 95]. We have used the IEEE 118 bus system since it is a simple
approximation of real power grids of the United States. The power transmission
line capacities are assigned from the set of capacities C = {20 MW, 60 MW, 120
MW, 200 MW, 332 MW}, and the total number of lines with these capacities are
38, 58, 56, 20, 7, respectively. The cardinality of the set C is denoted by |C|, and here
|C| = 5. In addition to the number of initial line failures (denoted by Fi ), some other
relevant grid operating characteristics that can affect the cascade are the power-grid
loading level (r), the load-shedding constraint level (θ), and the capacity estimation
error (e) [41]. Here r is defined as the ratio between the total demand and the total
generation capacity of the power grid; θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the load controlling capability of the power grid; it is 1 if no load shed can be performed, and it is 0 if all the
loads are shed-able whenever needed. Moreover, e controls the capacity estimation
error measured by the control center and is defined as e :=
Cjopt

Cjopt −αj
Cjopt

∈ [0, 0.5], where

is the estimated optimal power-flow through the transmission line of capacity

j ∈ C and αj ∈ C is the power-flow threshold of the line above which the protection
relay trip the transmission line [41]. Note that here we are following [41] in looking
at these parameters.
In our simulations, we start with more than one random initial transmission line
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Table 6.1: Number of failures of a line of capacity j at next time step following
failure of a line capacity i; NF:= No Failure.
XXX
XXX j(MW)
20
60
120 200 332
NF
XXX
i(MW)
XXX
20 24557 17663 3213 115
20 12776
60 23163

5382

2765

59

10

4623

120 13617

2046

523

24

2

1167

200

4234

125

64

1

0.25

8

332

1602

83

21

0.25

1

1

NF

0

0

0

0

0

∞

failure (due to “N − 1 security,” which ensures that if only one transmission line
fails the power grid can compensate for that failure without further failures). Then
we track the number of failures of transmission lines with different capacities at the
following time steps. We run simulations and collect different types of data: 1) the
number of failed lines of capacity j (j ∈ C) at time k + 1 following the failure of a
line of capacity i (i ∈ C) at time k (k = 1,· · · , K, where K is the number of time
steps); 2) the total number of transmission lines failed when the cascade stops; 3)
the time step at which the cascade stops. We describe these data individually in the
following three subsections. All these data are then incorporated into a model for
the evolution of failures of transmission lines in a power grid, presented in Section
IV.

6.1.1

The number of failed lines of capacity j at time step
k + 1 following the failure of a line of capacity i at time
step k

Table I shows the number of failures of a line of capacity j at time k + 1 following
the failure of a line of capacity i at time k, for Fi = 4, r = 0.85, θ = 0.2, e = 0.45.
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Figure 6.1: Probability of failures of a line of capacity j at time k +1 following failure
of a line of capacity i at time k.

The simulation data are collected using 10,000 runs with random initial failures of
transmission lines. For each run, we track the transmission line failures until the
cascade stops. Once the power grid reaches the cascade stop state it remains in that
state (i.e., no more failures), therefore in Table I, we use the symbol infinity (∞) to
indicate the no failure (NF) state. The numbers in Table I are calculated as follows:
if there is only one line failure with capacity c ∈ C at time k then we use that line
as the source line (rows in Table I) that causes the next line failures (columns in
Table I) at time k + 1. For example, let a line with capacity 60 MW fail at time k
and three lines of capacities 20 MW, 60 MW and 120 MW fail at time k + 1. Then
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looking at the second row (60 MW) we add a 1 to the first column (20 MW), a 1
to the second column (60 MW), and a 1 to the third column (120 MW). However,
if there is more than one line failure at time k then we assume that the next line
failures at time k + 1 occur due to equal contributions from all of the previous line
failures. For instance, if there are m line failures at time step k and l failures at time
k + 1, then each of the m lines (respective capacity rows in the Table I) contributes
a fraction

1
m

to the failing of each of the l lines (respective capacity columns in the

Table I).
Figure 6.1 shows the probability of failure of a transmission line with capacity
j at time k + 1 due to the failure of a line with capacity i at time k, denoted by
pi (j), for a given r, θ, e, and different values of Fi . In all the three panels, we see
that the probability of failure for the low-capacity lines is larger than for the highcapacity lines. While the decreasing trend of failure probabilities with increasing
line capacities follows for all lines, there is a transition occurs when the line capacity
increases approximately above 41 MW (circled in Fig. 1). Namely, we see that
for line capacities j lower (higher) than 41 MW the lower capacity lines are more
vulnerable to failure than the higher (lower) capacity lines. We incorporate these
observations in a model that is presented in the next section.

6.1.2

The total number of transmission lines failed when the
cascade stops

Figure 6.2(a) is a histogram of the total number of transmission lines failed when the
cascade stops and Fig. 6.2(b) shows a histogram of the total number of transmission
lines of different capacities failed when the cascade stops. In addition, the ratios
between the number of eventually failed transmission lines and the total number of
transmission lines for different capacities are shown in Table II. Table II shows that
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Figure 6.2: Histogram of the total number of transmission lines failed when the
cascade stops. Here Fi = 4, r = 0.85, θ = 0.2, e = 0.45.

Table 6.2: Ratio between the number of eventually failed lines and total number of
lines for h
different capacities.
hhhh
hhh Capacity (MW)
hhhh
20
60
120 200 332
hhh
Parameters
hh
h
As in Fig. 6.1(a) 0.71 0.29 0.18 0.1 0.14
As in Fig. 6.1(b) 0.76 0.35 0.18

0.1

0.14

As in Fig. 6.1(c) 0.74 0.31 0.21 0.15 0.28

overall the higher capacity lines are less vulnerable to cascading failures, which can
also be seen from Fig. 6.2(b). This observation, that lines of different capacities
are more-or-less prone to fail provides the main motivation for this study. As an
example, considering the worst-case failure for each transmission line (i.e., for any
transmission line we take the largest number of failure from 10,000 runs), the total
number of eventually failed lines of 20 MW, 60 MW, 120 MW, 200 MW, 332 MW,
capacities are found to be 29, 19, 14, 5, 3, respectively (with the parameters as in
Fig. 6.1(c)).
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of the number of time step at which the cascade stops. Here
Fi = 4, r = 0.85, θ = 0.2, e = 0.45.

6.1.3

The time step at which the cascade stops

In Fig. 6.3 we show the normalized frequency (probability) for the time steps at which
the cascade stops. From this data, we see that a large majority of the cascades stops
at time step k = 3 and the average time at which the cascade stops is equal to 3.55.

6.2

Parametric model

In this section, we propose a parametric model to reproduce the dynamics of transmission line failures that we have seen from the optimal DC power-flow simulations.
In this model, we incorporate the three types of data described in Section III A, B,
and C.
From Fig. 6.1 we observe two main trends affecting the evolution of line failures.
Observation 1 : The low-capacity lines are more vulnerable to failures than the highcapacity lines, i.e., pi (j) is a decreasing function of the line capacity j. Observation 2 :
pi (j) is an increasing function of the capacity i for small j and a decreasing function
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Figure 6.4: Power-law fitting (solid line) for the probability of failures of a line of
capacity j at next time step following failure of line of capacity i. Here Fi = 4, r =
0.85, θ = 0.2, e = 0.45.

of the capacity i for large j (due to the transition shown in Fig. 6.1).
Based on these observations, we propose a parametric equation to capture the
probabilities of line failure evolution,
pi (j) = αj β (1 + γi(j − jth )),

(6.1)

where the term αj β , α > 0, β < 0 reflects Observation 1. The term 1 + γi(j − jth )
reflects Observation 2 ; this latter term is larger (smaller) than 1 when j is smaller
(larger) than jth . The values of α, β, γ, and jth are computed by fitting the data in
Fig. 6.4 so as to minimize the overall mean square error. For our data we obtained
the following values of the optimally fitted parameters: α = 2415, β = −2.6, γ =
−9.95 × 10−6 , and jth = 41, which were then used to generate the fitted solid line in
Fig. 6.4. Note that the value jth = 41 captures the transitions observed in Fig. 6.1.
An important assumption in (6.1) is that the line failure curve follows a powerlaw. This assumption is consistent with the long tail of the probability curve shown
in Fig. 6.4.

102

Chapter 6. A data-driven model for simulating the line failure in power grids

6.2.1

Dynamical model for the failures of transmission lines

Our discrete-time model for the evolution of failures of transmission lines of different
capacities j ∈ C is the following,
Xj [k + 1] = Xj [k] + Fj [k]σ

X


pi (j) Xi [k] − Xi [k − 1] ,

(6.2)

i∈C

where Xj [k] is the number of failed lines of capacity j at time k, Fj [k] = (Fj∗ − Xj [k])
is the number of functioning lines of capacity j at time k. We set the initial conditions
in the model as follows: Xj [k] = 0 for k < 0, and we assume a certain number of
initial failures occurring at time k = 0. Here Fj∗ is the total number of transmission
lines of capacity j that eventually fail when the cascade stops (from Section III B).
Moreover, pi (j) is given by (6.1). Finally, σ(y) is a sigmoidal function defined as



0, if y ≤ 0



σ(y) := 1, if y ≥ κ




 y , otherwise,
κ

(6.3)

where κ is a constant to be determined from the simulation data. By definition,
σ ∈ [0, 1] and σ(y) approaches 0 for small y and approaches 1 for large y. Note that,
the product of σ and Fj [k] gives the number of functional line of capacity j that will
fail at time k.
Figure 6.5 shows the evolution of failure probabilities of lines with different capacities given by the σ evaluated at k = 1, 2, ..., 14. Here we have used κ = 3.55 in
all simulations, since it is the average time found in section 6.1.3. Besides, setting
κ = 3.55 enables the trend of total line failure generated by the model to better
replicate the trend of real-world line failure data, as we will show later in Fig. 6.7.
From (6.2), we see that for any line with capacity j ∈ C, the number of failed lines
at time step k +1 can be obtained by adding the new failed lines at time step k to the
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Figure 6.5: Time-evolution of failure probabilities of transmission lines with discrete
time steps.

total number of failed lines that failed until time step k. The number of new failed
P

p
(j)
X
[k]
−
X
[k
−
1]
.
lines of capacity j at time step k is given by Fj [k]σ
i
i
i
i∈C
A steady state is reached when there are no new line failures. Hence, the conditions
for the steady state for each line of capacity j are the following: either Fj [k] = 0 for
P
all j ∈ C, indicating there are no more functional lines to fail or i∈C pi (j) Xi [k] −

Xi [k − 1] = 0 indicating the number of new line failures is zero. However, because
pi (j) > 0, this can only happen for Xj [k + 1] = Xj [k] for all js, i.e, no new failures at
the previous time step. Iterating this backward in time this is only possible if there
are no new failures at the initial time 0.
We rewrite the (6.2) for all j ∈ C,
Xj [k + 1] = Xj [k] + Fj [k]σ

X


pi (j) Xi [k] − Yi [k] ,
(6.4)

i∈C

Yj [k + 1] = Xj [k].
Theorem 6.2.1. Assume some Xj [0] > 0, Xj [k] = 0 for k < 0 and pi (j) > 0. The
evolution of transmission line failure given by (6.2) asymptotically converges to the
equilibrium point Xj [k] = Fj∗ , Yj [k] = Fj∗ for all j ∈ C.
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Proof. Let us write the state of the system at time k in column vector form as
X[k] = (X20 [k], X60 [k], ..., X332 [k]), Y[k] = (Y20 [k], Y60 [k], ..., Y332 [k]), and Z[k] =
[XT [k], YT [k]]T , where T denotes the matrix transpose operator. Then (6.4) can be
rewritten in vectorial form
(6.5)

Z[k + 1] = f (Z[k]),

where f is a continuous function. We consider the equilibrium point Xj = Fj∗ , Yj =
Fj∗ for all j which corresponds to Fj = 0 for all j, i.e., there are no more functional
lines of any types to fail. We label this equilibrium point as Z̄ = [X̄T , ȲT ]T , where
∗
∗
∗
∗
). In order to show convergence to the
, ..., F332
X̄ = (F20
, ..., F332
) and Ȳ = (F20

equilibrium point Z̄, we need to show there exists a Lyapunov function V(Z) in a
region of attraction D := {Z ∈ R|C|×|C| : 0 ≤ Xj ≤ Fj∗ , 0 ≤ Yj ≤ Fj∗ for all j ∈ C}
(Theorem 1, Section 9.6 [96]). We define
V(Z) :=

X

(Xj [k] − Fj∗ )2 + (Yj [k] − Fj∗ )2 .

(6.6)

j∈C

It is easy to check the Lyapunov function defined by (6.6) satisfies all three properties
of a Lyapunov function for the discrete-time system given by (6.5), namely, it is a
continuous function, it has a unique minimum at Z̄, and ∆V(Z) := V(f (Z))−V(Z) <
0 at any point in D except Z̄ [96]. To verify the latter condition, note that for
0 ≤ Xj [k] < Fj∗ and 0 ≤ Yj [k] < Fj∗ ,
V(f (Z)) = V(Z[k + 1]) =

X
(Xj [k + 1] − Fj∗ )2 + (Yj [k + 1] − Fj∗ )2
j∈C

=

X

<

X

Fj∗ − Xj [k]

2

1 − σ(·)

2

2
2
+ Fj∗ − Xj [k − 1] 1 − σ(·) , (by (6.4))

j∈C

(Fj∗ − Xj [k])2 + (Fj∗ − Xj [k − 1])2 = V(Z),

j∈C

where we have used 0 < σ ≤ 1, since σ = 0 only when the system is already in the
equilibrium state. This proves the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point Z̄;
therefore, the cascade stops at Z̄, i.e., at Fj [k] = 0 for all j ∈ C.
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Figure 6.6: Time-evolution of failures of transmission lines versus the discrete time
steps: (a) line failures data using the model in (6.2), (b) optimal power-flow simulation of IEEE 118 bus system using MATPOWER, where the vertical bars are the
standard deviation of the number of line failures.

Figure 6.6(a) shows the time-evolution of line failures of different capacities
given by our dynamical model. Figure 6.6(b) shows the line failure data from optimal power-flow simulation using MATPOWER with initial conditions Fi = 4, r =
0.85, θ = 0.2, e = 0.45. Here we average the line failures over 10,000 runs where
the vertical bars in Fig. 6.6(b) show the standard deviation of the number of line
failures. Comparing Fig. 6.6(b) with Fig. 6.6(a), we can see that the trends of
average line failure generated by the model and MATPOWER simulation follow a
similar pattern.

6.3

Comparison of model results with real-world
data

In this section, we compare our model results of the total (cumulative) line failure
with real-world data that are collected from two real-world cascading failure events
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Figure 6.7: Total number of failed lines obtained from the proposed model and realworld cascading failure data: (a) total line failures in the July 1996 black (solid
line), August 1996 WSCC blackout (dashed lines) (b) total line failures data using
the proposed model with different value of κ.

[97, 98]. It can be seen from the Fig. 6.7, the trend of total line failures from the
model (Fig. 6.7(b)) is qualitatively similar to the trends observed from the real-world
data (Fig. 6.7(a)) (here Fig. 6.7(a) is reproduced from [41].). In Fig. 6.7(b), the
parameter κ of (6.3) controls the slope of the total line failure curve in the simulation.
Note that the failure behavior in the initial phase of real data is slightly different
than the initial phase of our model results. This is because the simplified discretetime approximation of the model does not correspond exactly with the actual time of
the real-world cascading failure event, namely, in our model a time step corresponds
to the time when line failures occur whereas for a real-world cascading failure there
are some time gaps between the increments of line failures. Note also that the total
number of line failures (vertical axis) are different for both figures, which are due to
different power-grid topologies used to compare model results with real-world data
(as we do not have topologies of the power grids described in [97, 98]).
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6.4

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we have proposed a data-driven parametric model to characterize
the dynamics of the propagation of transmission line failures in the power grid.
This model describes the evolution of cascading failure through transmission lines of
different capacities. Due to unavailability of all the relevant quantities from the realworld cascading failure data, we have used the data generated by the optimal powerflow simulator (MATPOWER) to feed the parametric model. We have demonstrated
that our model can reproduce the trends in the dynamics of line failure in the power
grid considering capacities of the transmission lines and compared model results with
real-world data. Our model outputs an estimate of the total capacity loss due to the
failure of transmission lines during cascading failures at any time step.
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Future Work

This dissertation analyzes the vulnerability of a communication network from many
aspects including the interception of inter-network connection, reliability of networks
due to physical attacks, propagation of initial failures/attacks in the interconnected
network, etc. In addition, the vulnerability of communication network due to interdependency with power grids is investigated and cascading failure in the power is
simulated. In this chapter we describe some possible directions of future research
that can be evolved from this dissertation.
For the inter-network connection optimization, as of now, we have considered
all the interconnections are identical an assumption may not hold in the practical
scenario. Thus we are currently working on the optimal interconnection considering
the variations in link capacities (or QoS of the links). Moreover, generalizing the
binary channel model to arbitrary size packet model and analyzing various natures
of data manipulations by intruders after the interception (e.g., manipulations of a
burst of the data packet), are also other possible extensions of this work. Analysis
with finite queuing delay would also make this work more realistic.
While modeling intensity of physical attacks on the physical infrastructure, the
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dynamics of network functionality needs to be studied under temporal correlation
among different types of stressors in the future. Moreover, robust techniques need
to be devised to minimize the impact of catastrophic stressors on the network.
The parametric model for finding the resiliency and efficiency of a secure network
is derived from simulation data, not by solving the optimization problem analytically.
The analysis of the optimality of the proposed optimization problems and the tradeoff between accuracy and complexity of the parametric model are left as future works.
Besides, validating the parametric model with data from the real-world network is
also a part of our future study. The generalization of this work for modeling the nonhomogeneous propagation of security risks (i.e., τ and c may vary based on the types
of security risks and links) would better capture the real-world threat propagation
in the ML network.
Further, as a future work, the theory developed in this dissertation, specifically
the interdependent influence model, can be extended to include more states (e.g.,
alarm state) of communication nodes and heterogeneous influences among communication network components. Moreover, capturing influences from communication
node to power nodes (e.g., smart grids) as well as the interactions among power
nodes will also be part of future research to make this model more realistic.
The data-driven model presented in this dissertation provides a simple approach
for reproducing the cascading failure behavior in power-grids from the simulation
data. The major limitation of our data-driven parametric model is that the model
needs to be calibrated when used on different network topologies. However, the
model parameters can be estimated by the optimal power-flow simulation given the
power grid topologies such as IEEE 300, Polish grid, etc. In addition, incorporation
of generator dynamics into the problem would make this problem to capture more
realistic cascading failures.
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Appendix A
CT vs. NX1X2 when pe varies

(a) α = 0

(b) α = 0.2

(c) α = 0.6

(d) α = 1

Figure A.1: The total Shannon capacity (CT ) vs. the number of interconnections
(NX1 X2 ) when pe is a function of pl .
Here we express pe as a function of pl . We define pe := αpl , where α is a parameter
between 0 and 1. Figure A.1 shows the total Shannon capacity (CT ) vs. the number
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of interconnections (NX1 X2 ) when pe is a function of pl . We see that when pe varies
with NX1 X2 we get a variation in CT ’s, which will change the current analysis of
finding optimal interconnection.
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Appendix B
Proof of the concavity of the
objective function of (2.12)
A function f : D ∈ R → R is said to be a convex function if it satisfies the following
two conditions [62]: 1) the domain D of the function f is a convex set, and 2) for any
two points x, y ∈ D, the function satisfies the following condition, f (θx + (1 − θ)y) ≤
θf (x) + (1 − θ)f (y),
f (θx + (1 − θ)y) ≤ θf (x) + (1 − θ)f (y),
where θ is in the range 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. One way to check the concavity of a differentiable
00

function is by differentiating it twice, i.e., f is concave if and only if f ≤ 0 and its
domain is convex.
Note that the interval [0, Nmax ] a line segment on real line which is a convex
set [62]. Now differentiating the objective function of (2.12) twice with respect to
NX1 X2 we get

2
(−1
1−p∗d

+ Cl ). Since 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 1,

objective function of (2.12) is concave.
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2
(−1
1−p∗d

+ Cl ) ≤ 0. Hence, the

Appendix C
2
Nmax
− 4(1 − Cl )NmaxRs∗ ≥ 0


Since Nmax Nmax − 4(1 − Cl )Rs∗ ≥ 0 and Nmax ≥ 0, we need to show Nmax − 4(1 −
Cl )Rs∗ ≥ 0, or Nmax ≥ 4(1 − Cl )Rs∗ . If Rs∗ < CT∗ , 4(1 − Cl )Rs∗ < 4(1 − Cl )CT∗ , and
4(1 − Cl )CT∗ = 4(1 − Cl )NX∗ 1 X2 C̄ (by (2.8) and for optimality NX1 X2 = NX∗ 1 X2 ),


4(1 − Cl ) Nmax C̄, if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
2(1−Cl )
=
(by (2.13))

4(1 − Cl )Nmax C̄,
if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1


2Nmax C̄,
if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
=

4(1 − Cl )Nmax C̄, if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1

∗

2Nmax (1 − NX1 X2 (1 − Cl )),
if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
Nmax
=
(by (2.7) and linear pl ),
∗

4(1 − Cl )Nmax (1 − NX1 X2 (1 − Cl )), if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1
Nmax


2Nmax (1 − 1 (1 − Cl )),
if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
2(1−Cl )
=
(by (2.13))

4(1 − Cl )Nmax (1 − (1 − Cl )), if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1




Nmax ,
if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5, Nmax ,
if 0 ≤ Cl ≤ 0.5,
=
=
.


4(Cl − C 2 )Nmax , if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1
≤ Nmax , if 0.5 < Cl ≤ 1, (Cl = 0.5)
l
Hence, from both inequalities we see that 4(1 − Cl )Rs∗ ≤ Nmax .
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